REPOET OF CAPT. GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 23 



to weaken the main body of the allies, to annoy and exasiDcrate the Russians, to occupy the 

 attention of some of tlieii' irregular troops, and to destroy more private than public property. 



The most accurate topographical map of the ground around Sebastopol, tliat I have seen, is 

 one published at the hydrographic office of the admiralty, February 2, 1856, and entitled 

 "Sebastopol: showing the Russian defence works and the approaches of the allied armies; by 

 Lieutenant George R. Wilkinson, R. N., under the direction oT Captain T. Spratt, R. N. C. B., 

 September 1, 1855." 



The permanent defences of the harbor of Sebastopol against an attack by water, although 

 inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully 

 equal to the purpose for which they were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the 

 Baltic, and the Black sea, all seem to establish, beyond controversy, the soundness of the view 

 so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must 

 always jirove more than a match for the strongest fleets. 



It is believed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in 

 the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm con- 

 viction on two vital points : 



1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be 

 comi^leted and armed with the least possible delay. 



2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought 

 against us, were we involved in an European war, but that it must be rendered manageable by 

 discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical military skill which can only be 

 acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit. 



In the day of sailing vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol would have been impossible. 

 It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were 

 unjirepared to sustain a siege. 



This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark upon our shores even 

 a larger force than that which finally encamped around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, 

 should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications must be 

 provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an 

 army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men 

 that we can bring to bear against it. 



An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men could easily be crushed by the unremitting 

 attacks of superior numbers ; but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined 

 veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, 

 if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We 

 cannot afibrd a Moscow campaign. 



Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be large enough to provide for all 

 the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence 

 of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be 

 unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; and the greatest possible care should be 

 bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. 



The militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and eflective basis ; 

 instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to sjjread sound 

 military information among them. 



In the vicinity of our seacoast fortifications it would be well to provide a sufficient number of 

 volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery ; detailing officers of the 



