10 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



partly to fhe mistake of Soimonoff, (who expiated his error with his life,) partly to the prompt 

 and correct judgment of Bosquet, and mainly to the fact that Gortschakoff did not conduct his 

 false attack with sufficient energy and decision. 



The desperate courage of the Kussians in this affair was fully acknowledged by all who par- 

 ticipated in it. 



In the battle of the Tchernaya the principal efforts of the Russians were directed against two 

 points : The Fedukhine heights, occupied by the French, and the hills occupied by the Sar- 

 dinians, between the Fedukhine and the village of Karlofka Pus, directly opposite Tchorgoun. 



A glance at the map will show the propriety of this attack ; for had either of these points 

 fallen the other must have followed ; and, had the Russians followed up the occupation by any 

 active measures, the result must have been the suspension of the siege. The question will 

 naturally arise, why did the Russians abandon these positions which were in their possession 

 during a part of the preceding winter? The only reasonable answer is, that their force was 

 then so small as to be entirely required for the defence of the city. 



The Fedukhine heights, the elevation of which is not far from 100', extend about two and a 

 half miles along the Tchernaya ; their horizontal plan is nearly a trident, with the points to- 

 ward the stream, the central branch sending forth some five irregular spurs ; towards the stream 

 the slopes are sufficiently steep to render access difficult, while full sweep is permitted to the 

 fire of artillery and musketry from the summit, and upon any one point from the collateral 

 spurs. 



The aqueduct, which is here a ditch so broad and deep as to be much in the way of troops, 

 skirts the northern base of the heights along thfeir whole extent. 



The Traktir bridge is directly in the prolongation of the ravine which separates the central 

 from the eastern branch of the trident ; for more than half a mile on each side of the bridge the 

 deep and vertical bed of the Tchernaya skirts the aqueduct. 



The Traktir bridge was of masonry, and covered by a weak tete-de-pont. 



Either the acqueduct or the stream was in itself a serious obstacle ; the two combined con- 

 stituted a formidable obstacle, requiring the use of bridges, situated as they were under the 

 close fire of the troops occupying the heights. 



The same difficulties, to a greater extent, existed at the foot of the Sardinian heights ; but the 

 attack in this quarter does not appear to have been quite so pronounced as that upon the French. 

 Both of these positions were strengthened to a certain extent by field works, especially that of 

 the Sardinians. 



It is certain that the allies had received intelligence, from a neutral capital, that the Russians 

 intended attacking on or about the 18th of August, although the precise point was not perhaps 

 specified. 



The Russian reports give their own version of the failure, attributing it to a failure on the 

 part of one of their generals to carry out his orders ; but the foregoing description of the ground 

 may render it probable that the repulse was due to the strength of the position and the gallantry 

 of its defenders, without seeking for other causes ; it may safely be said that the defeat of the 

 Russians was not owing to any want of courage and impetuosity on their part. 



The events of Inkermann and Traktir seem to lead to the conclusion that the Russians moved 

 in too heavy and unwieldy masses ; this system of tactics, which would on many fields, no doubt, 

 carry all before it, if followed by a rapid deployment, in these cases exposed them to terrible 

 losses, and rendered impossible that effective development of numerical force and individual 

 exertion which was necessary to carry the day. 



