REPORT OF CAPT. GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 9 



ceptible of a strong defence from whatever direction it may be attacked. Were it occupied by 

 the Russians, the siege of the Karabalnaia became impossible, and the position of the allies 

 dangerous in the extreme ; if strongly occupied by the allies, their right became perfectly secure. 



Could the Russians have anticipated a siege of Sebastopol, it would have been an unpardon- 

 able error not to have occupied the Inkermann by a small permanent work. How little they 

 were prepared for an attack by land will probably be shown in the sequel ; but as things were, 

 it appears to be a grave error not to have intrenched the position from the beginning. It was 

 still more inexcusable on the part of the allies to have omitted the occupation of the position in 

 force ; nor, with proper field works, would a very large force have been necessary. 



The Russian jjlan for the battle of November 5 was most excellent in conception ; and, as far 

 as mere orders could go, nothing seemed wanting to insure success, and drive the English 

 partly over the steep borders of the plateau into the open arms of Gortschakoff, partly into the 

 sea, and the rest to Kamiesch. It must be kept in view that the principal object of the Russians 

 in giving battle at the Inkermann was to prevent an assault upon the town, then regarded as 

 too weak to resist it; in this respect, although at a heavy cost, they gained their point, for they 

 effectually rendered an assault impossible for many months thereafter. In considering the plan 

 of attack, the Russian general rejected the idea of a movement on the allied centre, (by the 

 ravine of the inner harbor,) because it was too effectually defended by the siege batteries of the 

 allies ; the attack upon their rear was rejected because the plateau was very difficult of access, 

 strongly guarded, and the affair of Balaklava had induced the allies to throw up works in that 

 direction. It was therefore determined to attack the English right and centre, making false 

 attacks on the French left and towards Balaklava. 



The spirit of the orders issued was as follows : General Soimonoff, with 16,200 infantry and 

 38 guns, to march up the Careening Bay ravine, ascend its western slope near the Victoria 

 redoubt, and attack the English centre. General Pauloff, with 13,500 infantry and 2S guns, to 

 march from the north side, descend into and cross the Tchernaya valley at the head of the bay, 

 ascend by Cathcart's ravine, and attack the English right ; the attack of these two commands 

 to be simultaneous. General Gortschakoff, with about 15,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 40 

 guns, to make a false attack upon Balaklava and the roads leading thence to the plateau. 

 General Timofajeff, with some 2,500 men and 4 guns, to make a false attack upon the French 

 left, carrying their batteries, if any confusion were observed among them. The batteries in the 

 town to keep up a warm fire. 



A close examination of the ground would indicate the propriety of this plan of attack ; the 

 difficulty arose in the execution. It would appear that in the orders the expression ^^left of the 

 Careening Bay ravine" was used for '^western;" Soimonoff improperly interjireted this as 

 meaning his own left, and thus brought his own and Pauloff's column into a state of confusion 

 which paralyzed the efforts of both, so that but a portion of either command was at any one 

 time engaged. 



As it was, the Russians were undoubtedly driving the exhauste i English before them when 

 Bosquet came up. Had the false attack towards Balaklava been properly conducted, Bosquet 

 would have been unable to assist the English; but, soon perceiving that the operations of 

 Gortschakoff were confined to a simple cannonade at long range, he readily divined the true 

 state of affairs, and by his prompt action saved the army. 



Timofajeff succeeded in spiking fifteen guns, and paralyzed the French left. 



It would thus seem that the result of the action was due partly to the courage of the En^'lish, 

 a © 



