6 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



train, wliich was landed on an oi^en beach, at a time when violent northers frequently suspended 

 work and cut oif all communication with the fleet, we opened fire upon Vera Cruz on the 

 thirteenth day after landing. 



Before entering upon the siege of Sebastopol, it may be well to refer to the battles which 

 varied the monotony of that long period, during which both parties evinced so much gallantry 

 and endurance in the usual operations of attack and defence, relieved often by the gallant 

 sorties of the garrison on the one hand, and on the other by the desperate assaults of the 

 besiegers. In the battle of the Alma, important chiefly because it established the morale of 

 the attacking party, the allies seem to have been, judging from the statements of both sides, 

 of about double the force of the Kussians. It does not appear that the position was really a 

 remarkably strong one, nor that it was at all improved by artificial means. The only field 

 works were a few trifiing barbette parapets in front of some of the batteries ; while the slopes 

 leading to the position seem often to have been, particularly on the Russian left, too steep to 

 permit the effective operation of the weapons of the defenders. Of the relative gallantry of the 

 troops composing the allied army this is no proper place to speak. It need only be said 

 that the column conducted by General Bosquet decided the retreat of the Russians, since it 

 turned their left flank. Of the propriety of this movement doubts may be entertained, consid- 

 ering always the subsequent movements of the allies. It would seem natural that two plans 

 ought to have been considered by the allied generals : the first, to cut ofi" the Russian army 

 from Sebastopol, and following the battle by a rapid advance ujjon the city, to enter it, at all 

 hazards, over the bodies of its weak garrison, effect their purposes, and either retire to the fleet 

 or hold the town ; the second, to cut off the Russian army of operations from all external succor 

 on the part of troops coming from the direction of Simpheropol, to drive them into the city, and 

 enter at their heels. 



To accomplish the first plan, the attack of Bosquet was proper, but should have been followed 

 up by such an unremitting pursuit as that which succeeded the battle of Jena. To gain the 

 second object, it would have been proper to attack the Russian right, and endeavor not only to 

 cut them off from Simj^heropol, but to throw them into the sea by pushing forward the allied 

 left so far and so rapidly as to cut them off from Sebastopol, and thus annihilate them. Neither 

 of these plans was fully carried out. The Russians retired in perfect order, abandoning only 

 one or two dismounted guns, thus justifying the supposition that their general ajjpreciated 

 much more fully than did the allies the delicate nature of his position. 



It must be stated that, during the battle, the garrison of Sebastopol consisted merely of four 

 battalions and the sailors of the fieet. The condition of its defences at that time will hereafter 

 be alluded to. 



In considering the operations of the Russians at this period, it must be remembered that the 

 nearest harbor to the north of Sebastopol that could at all answer as a depot for the operations 

 of a siege was the poor one of Eupatoria, forty-eight miles distant ; and that to the south of the 

 city, the only harbors were Balaklava and the series between Cape Chersonese and the city. 

 It ■Cras clearly the interest of the Russians to oblige the allies to attack on the north rather than 

 on the south side ; for the reasons that the former was already in an efficient state of defence, 

 requiring open trenches to reduce it, while the latter was open; and more especially that their 

 long line of commimication with Eupatoria and the rear of their position would have remained 

 exposed to the constant attacks of the reinforcements which might soon be expected by the 

 Russians, while the city could still be supplied by the more circuitous route of the valley of 

 Baidar, the allied force being too small to complete the investment. It was impossible for the 



