REPORT 



TJPON THE 



OPERATIONS IN THE CRIMEA. 



BELiEVlNa that the oiHcers of the army have a right to know the opinions formed hy one of 

 their number who enjoyed the oj^portunity of visiting, in an official character, the scene of the 

 recent contest in the East, I somewhat reluctantly undertake the task of attempting to give a 

 succinct account of those general points of the operations in the Crimea which are most important 

 and interesting in their professional bearing. 



For many and obvious reasons no attempt will be made to enter into details. The task would 

 be an endless one were the means at hand ; and nothing but an accurate survey, or very minute 

 and frequent examinations, of every part of the vast field on which these operations occurred, 

 combined with the advantage of having been an eye-witness of the events themselves, and the 

 circumstances under which they took place, could justify any one in undertaking to give a 

 detailed account of the campaign of the Crimea. It is known that circumstances rendered it 

 impossible for the commission to reach the seat of war until a short time after the fall of the 

 Malakoff. I have reason to expect that the other members of the commission will enter into con- 

 siderable detail with regard to the condition and nature of the Russian defences as they existed 

 at the close of the siege, the amount, calibre, and effect of the artillery employed, &c. 



Although fully aware that it is much easier to criticize operations after the result is known 

 than to direct them at the time, I shall not hesitate to invite attention to what appear to be 

 evident mistakes on either side ; this, not for the purpose of finding fault, or instituting com- 

 parisons, but with the hope that it may serve to draw the attention of our officers to the same 

 points, and, perhaps, assist in preventing similar errors on our own part hereafter. 



From the general interest felt in the late war, it is more than probable that every officer of 

 our army followed step by step the movements of the allies from Gallipoli to Varna, from 

 Varna to Old Fort, and thence to the scene of the gigantic strife in the Heracleidan Chersonese. 



It may seem absurd to compare small affairs with great, but it cannot fail to be a source of 

 satisfaction to reflect upon the fact that in the operations against Vera Cruz, the first thing of 

 that nature we had ever undertaken, we completed a difficult line of investment on the second 

 day after landing, while the experienced troops of the allies required nearly seven days to land 

 and march about 15 miles to the Alma ; bearing in mind that they landed without knapsacks, 

 (the English at least,) with nothing but a scanty field material, and that they were in constant 

 communication with their fleet. It was twenty-seven days after the battle of the Alma that 

 they opened fire upon Sebastopol, although the distance frorq the Alma to Balaklava did not 

 exceed 30 miles ; and their siege train was with the fleet, and landed in the secure harbors of 

 Kamiesch and Balaklava. In spite of the delays arising from mistakes in forwarding our siege 



