EEPOET OF CAPT. GEORGE B. M'^CLELLAN. 339 



night, or thick weather ; hy choosing the route affording the hest cover ; hy announcing an enter- 

 prise of an entirely different nature ; and, sometimes, hy starting in the opposite direction, that 

 after having made a considerable circuit we may finally come out in the real direction. 



§ 497. Besides the general conditions specified, there are also particular conditions, relating 

 to each of the cases specified in § 493, which are discussed in the following § §. 



§ 498. Attacks upon the enemy's outposts are undertaken either to harass him, by obliging 

 him to be in constant readiness for action, or to divert his attention, in order to cover some 

 movement favorable to us. 



In this, and the other cases, we should endeavour to extend the alarm over the greatest possible 

 space with the fewest possible men. 



For this, it is advantageous to divide the party into several sections, which, attacking at 

 several points, either simultaneously or successively, break through the chain, gallop up to the 

 main guards, and having alarmed them, at once fall back ; if successful they seize some videttes 

 or even pickets. In such an attack every section exerts itself to appear as strong as possible, 

 they therefore scatter, and generally keep up a warm firing and great noise. 



§ 499. Besides harassing the enemy, which is the direct object of these attacks, they may 

 procure the advantage of making the enemy careless if they are frequently repeated, and thus 

 facilitate the success of more important operations. 



§ 500. In making an attack for the purpose of capturing a post of the enemy, it is well to divide 

 the detachment detailed for the service into three parts ; one moves to the roar of the post, on 

 its road of retreat and reinforcement ; another part makes the direct attack ; the third is held in 

 reserve to support the attack, or, in case of failure, cover the retreat of the other parts. If 

 possible, it is well to conceal the reserve until the moment when the enemy is allured to pursue 

 the repulsed party ; then the reserve, acting as an ambuscade, endeavors to take the enemy in 

 flank or in rear, and seize the abandoned post. 



§ 501. If the post attacked is in a village, the place of assembly should be ascertained, and a 

 party of men sent there to seize the enemy as they arrive singly upon the alarm. 



§ 502. In general, in attacking a post with the design of taking possession of it, the greatest 

 silence should be observed and the firing commenced only when the attacking party has been 

 already discovered ; then rapidity and decision are necessary, so that the enemy may not have 

 time to recover; rapidity and audacity in the attack usually command success. 



§ 503. If the enemy retreats, then on the return march the reserve usually marches in front 

 with the prisoners ; the attacking party follows; the party which moved on the enemy's rear 

 acts as a rear guard. 



§ 504. If the ground permits the attack may be combined with an ambuscade. For this 

 purpose veteran troops are detailed, who are concealed with the object of falling suddenly upon 

 the enemy when he has been decoyed to their position. In this case, success depends much upon 

 the conduct of the troops who act openly, and who should endeavor to decoy the enemy into an 

 imprudent pursuit, and draw him into the ambuscade. 



§ 505. The success of the ambuscade itself depends chiefly upon seizing the proper moment 

 for action. As a general rule it should not begin to act too soon, lest the enemy retreat without 

 loss. It is best to allow his leading parties to pass so far by that he may be attacked in flank, 

 or, still better, in rear and his retreat cut off. 



§ 506. Apart from the object of seizing important points, attacks are sometimes made upon 

 the enemy's posts with the special object of encouraging the military spirit of our own troops, 

 and increasing their boldness and self confidence by partial successes. 



