REPORT OF CAPT. GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 341 



§ 515. To insure the success of a reconnaissance, whatever its object may be, it is necessary 

 to attack suddenly, and have a secure retreat. 



§ 516. Small reconnoitring parties usually consist of cavalry alone ; but if a certain effort is 

 required to seize any point, or if we must leave it occupied while we pass beyond it, then 

 artillery and infantry must be added. Here, as in all cases when it is necessary to combine 

 rapidity of movement with some defensive strength, mounted rifles may be advantageously 

 employed. 



§ 517. The strength of a reconnoitring party can only be determined by its object and the 

 obstacles it may be expected to encounter, not only from the greater or less force of the enemy, 

 but from the nature of the ground, the distance of the place to be examined from our main body, 

 the degree of security of the retreat, &c. If the affair consists merely in driving in an indepen- 

 dent picket and holding its position long enough to make an examination, a strong patrol will 

 be sufficient ; but if it is necessary to examine a large portion of the enemy's position, or to 

 ascertain his strength, a considerable force may be required. But everything stated in this 

 chapter relates more particularly to reconnaissances made with small detachments. 



§ 518. Whatever may be the object of the reconnaissance and the composition of the detach- 

 ment, the first thing is to determine the point from which the examination can be best made, 

 and the principal effort must be directed to the occupation of this point. This effort should not 

 be limited to a direct attack, but should be aided by several simultaneous attacks upon other 

 points, in order to distract the attention of the enemy, divide his force, and throw him into 

 irresolution. Such operations will be particularly useful if the object is to ascertain the strength 

 of the enemy, for the partial attacks force him to show his whole force. 



§ 519. Having occupied the point from which the reconnaissance is to be made, we should not 

 be enticed into a pursuit of the beaten enemy, but proceed at once to strengthen ourselves in 

 the position — that is, we should take measures for meeting the enemy with advantage when he 

 returns to the attack ; with this view, the safety of the flanks must be particularly attended to, 

 to prevent the enemy from endangering the retreat of the detachment by turning the position. 



§ 520. If the enemy makes a resolute attack before the reconnaissance is completed, the degree 

 of defence must depend upon the importance of the object, that the sacrifice may be in proportion. 

 A retreat commenced at the wrong time may encounter peculiar difficulty ; to commence the 

 retreat before the completion of the reconnaissance, is to abandon the work when nearly finished ; 

 remaining too long in position may expose us to useless loss. Therefore, if the object is to 

 ascertain the strength of the enemy, the retreat should be commenced at once, because the enemy 

 will soon recover from the first attack and gain the means of assuming the offensive. 



§ 521. When a party has made a reconnaissance, its arrangements during the retreat present 

 nothing unusual ; it should carefully guard its flanks by strong parties or patrols, and always 

 expect to be violently attacked. 



§ 522. This is particularly to be anticipated when the object was to ascertain the strength of 

 the enemy, and the retreat was commenced late. In such cases, prudence demands that we 

 should place, beforehand, on the road of retreat, separate supports of sufficient strength to stop 

 the pursuit and cover the retreat of the party. 



§ 523. When the supports of the reconnoitring party are shown, and the enemy is near, it 

 is prudent to have a considerable part, if not the whole, of the main body ready for action. 

 For it may easily happen that the enemy, having been alarmed by the reconnaissance, and 

 afterwards excited by its repulse and pursuit, may change his operations into a general attack, 



