342 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



especially if he observes the slightest negligence on our part ; in this case, all the advantage 

 would be on his side. 



Remark. — There are two kinds of reconnaissances : those to ascertain the general nature of 

 the country, jjosition and movements of the enemy, &c. ; and those immediately preceding an 

 action. The first should he made with extreme minuteness, and as much time given to them 

 as possible ; they may he well done by a man with but little genius and of a careful business 

 turn of mind. The second rec[uire the highest order of military genius, a rapid and unerring 

 coup d'ceil, an accurate and instinctive knowledge of the tactics of all arms ; they must he made 

 with extreme rapidity, and acted upon at once. 



There have been innumerable instances in military history, and not a few in our own, where, 

 on the one hand, invaluable time and opportunity have been lost by the system of slow and 

 minute reconnaissances in front of the enemy — obtaining the horizontal curves of a field of 

 battle ; on the other hand, plunging headlong into action without a proper knowledge of the 

 ground. 



The important points are : the strength of the enemy, the key points of his position, the 

 nature of the ground between your own position and his — that is, is it passable, and for what 

 arms? Let the subordinate commanders attend to minor obstacles. As soon as the proper 

 information is obtained on these points, act. The mere moral efiect of a rapid and unhesitating 

 movement is very great. During the ordinary marches and intervals of rest, the cavalry and 

 staff officers should collect every possible item of information ; nothing is too trifling to be worth 

 knowing ; if they have done their duty properly, no general need hesitate more than a few 

 minutes when he finds himself in presence of the enemy. 



CHAPTEE III. 



OF CONVOYS. 

 ARTICLE 1. 



The defence of convoys. 



§524. The rules for escorting trains, and the arrangements for securing them against attack, 

 were explained in Part I, Chapter I, article 5 ; in the present article will be explained the 

 manner of defending the convoy when attacked. 



§525. The immediate defence of a very large train is, if not wholly impossible, at least very 

 difiicult, for it involves an injurious division of force. 



§526. The following rules are laid down as the most important: to keep the force as much 

 concentrated as possible, in order to act ofiensively, leaving with the wagons only the number 

 of men absolutely necessary ; if this is impossible, an eiFort should be made to keep the enemy 

 away from the train as long as possible. 



§ 527. In accordance with this, on the approach of the enemy, if the force of the escort is at 

 all in proportion to that of the attacking party, it is best to move out to meet the enemy with 

 the greater part of the escort, overthrow him, and clear the country in the direction of the march 

 of the train. Even if the escort is much weaker than the enemy, it should move out to meet him, 

 but must limit its subsequent operations to the defensive, endeavoring to keep the enemy away 

 from the train long enough for it to gain a good defensive position. 



§ 528. In the latter case, the train is, if possible, parked in square, or corralled. The escort, 

 having kept off the enemy long enough to permit this, retreats upon the train ; the defence, 



