GOETHE'S ' FAKBENLEHKE.' 73 



will be his tendency to lie when he falls into error, and 

 the vaster will be that error when he makes up his mind 

 to persist in it. 



This is all intended to throw light upon Newton. 

 When Groethe passes from Newton himself to his followers, 

 the small amount of reserve which he exhibited when 

 dealing with the master entirely disappears. He mocks 

 their blunders as having not even the merit of originality. 

 He heaps scorn on Newton's imitators. The expression 

 of even a truth, he says, loses grace in repetition, while 

 the repetition of a blunder is impertinent and ridiculous. 

 To liberate oneself from an error is difficult, sometimes 

 indeed impossible for even the strongest and most gifted 

 minds. But to take up the error of another, and persist 

 in it with stififnecked obstinacy, is a proof of poor 

 qualities. The obstinacy of a man of originality when 

 he errs may make us angry, but the stupidity of the 

 copyist irritates and renders us miserable. And if in 

 our strife with Newton we have sometimes passed the 

 bounds of moderation, the whole blame is to be laid 

 upon the school of which Newton was the head, whose 

 incompetence is proportional to its arrogance, whose 

 laziness is proportional to its self-sufficiency, and whose 

 virulence and love of persecution hold each other in 

 perfect equilibrium. 



There is a great deal more invective of this kind, 

 but you will probably, and not without sadness, con- 

 sider this enough. Invective may be a sharp weapon, 

 but over-use blunts its edge. Even when the denuncia- 

 tion is just and true, it is an error of art to indulge in 

 it too long. We not only incur the risk of becoming 

 vapid, but of actually inverting the force of reproba- 

 tion which we seek to arouse, and of bringing it back 

 by recoil upon ourselves. At suitable intervals, sepa- 

 rated from each other by periods of dignified reserve, 



