No. 4.] EURAL LAW. 195 



to lead a horse in the way and manner described, and the 

 mere fact that he was so leading the horse was not such 

 evidence of negligence as would exclude a recovery for the 

 bite of the dog ; but the judge refused to give that ruling, 

 and submitted the question of negligence to the jury, which 

 returned a verdict for the defendant ; but our supreme court 

 said that the ruling ought to have been given, because the lead- 

 ing of a horse behind a wagon was simply a condition, and 

 not in any just sense a contributory cause of the injury. In 

 the course of the opinion Judge Lathrop wittily remarks 

 that to hold that the question whether leading a horse behind 

 a wagon, as was done in this case, should be submitted to 

 the jury as evidence of negligence in inducing an attack by 

 the dog, would amount to the submitting to the jury the 

 question whether the color of the horse, or of the wagon, 

 or of the driver of the wagon, might have induced an attack ; 

 and the law doesn't pay this respect to the characteristics or 

 prejudices of the dog. 



It has been held in another case that the fact that a dog is 

 killing hens is no justification for killing the animal, unless 

 the hens can be saved only in that way ; but apparently if 

 the dog were worrying cattle or sheep, he might be killed. 

 In another case, the defendant, in trying to stop a fight be- 

 tween his dog and the plaintiff's dog, struck at them with a 

 stick. In raising the stick he accidentally struck the plain- 

 tiff, who was standing behind them, in the eye, and suit was 

 brought for the injury ; but the court said there could be 

 no recovery without proving negligence on the part of the 

 defendant and due care on the part of the plaintiff. 



Almost every one knows that there is in this State a statute 

 which provides that any owner or keeper of a dog shall forfeit 

 to any person injured double the amount of the injury sus- 

 tained by him, to be recovered in an action of tort. This 

 statute makes it a perilous thing to own a dog, for it rarely 

 happens that a defendant escapes being mulcted in damages 

 in an action brought for the bite of a dog under this statute. 



The only exception I recall is one where the plaintiff in- 

 terfered with his dog and another dog, that were fighting, 

 and was bitten ; and the question was left to the jury whether 

 he was in the exercise of due care in interfering in the fight. 



