I^'TRODUCTOKY. 63 



base all philosophy upon a purely Scientific foundation. 

 It is not necessary, at present, to examine what has been 

 the nature and the result of these efforts. We shall 

 come across them in the sequel when dealing with special 

 philosophical problems. At present it is sufficient to note 

 that these attempts have not been found generally accept- 

 able, and have had little practical influence. It must 

 be admitted that individual beliefs and convictions still 

 play a very large part in the region of thought ; that 

 they have quite as mueh the right to be regarded 

 as facts as any more definite, scientific, or historical 

 knowledge. For although it is true that it will rarely be 

 possible for two persons to agree exactly where beliefs 

 and convictions are in question, it is just as true on the 

 other side that these beliefs and convictions, in their 

 collective aggregate, exert upon our practical life an 

 even greater influence than exact knowledge and science 

 itself. 



Most persons are unable or unwilling to take a correct 

 inventory of their beliefs and convictions ; they never- 

 theless, willingly or unwillingly, submit more or less to 

 the existing laws of the society in which they live, and 

 to manifold restrictions and ordinances of a legal, moral, 

 and religious nature. 



They do so consciously or unconsciously, admitting in 

 this manner that the convictions and beliefs of which 

 these laws and ordinances are the outcome have a 

 marked reality and are of paramount importance. 

 And if we consider all the more important steps 

 which we take, either in our individual or in our 

 social and political life, and try to analyse the motives 



