INTRODUCTORY. 61 



which they have used. If they have done so it has 

 usually been after they had successfully used them, and 

 then even their account has not always been ^ marked 

 either by particular clearness or consistency. In fact, 

 the practice of the scientific method, now universally ad- 

 mitted, resembles very much the use of language which 

 is not primarily acquired by the study of grammar and 

 syntax, but by the practice of speaking and reading. 

 Some of the greatest writers, especially in this country, 

 would probably be quite unable to give an account of the 

 correctness and beauty of their style, which is rather an 

 unconscious expression of their individuality. 



In the case of philosophy, we seem still to be in the 

 position of the learners of a foreign tongue ; we have to 

 go through all the intricate rules of etymology and syntax. 

 The stylistic handling of these subjects has not become a 

 second nature to us like the use of a language in which 

 we have got beyond the tuitional stage. Accordingly 

 we find all through the century an endless discussion and 

 ever- repeated attempts referring to the fixing of the right 

 method and procedure ; some maintaining that the method 

 of philosophy is purely logical or metaphysical with as 

 much emphasis as others denounce the logical method as 

 empty, ridicule metaphysics as pernicious, and preach the 

 pure application of scientific methods as the only pro- 

 mising and fruitful way. By doing so, we may point out, 

 they again expose themselves to the just retort of their 

 opponents, that their chosen method is only applicable 

 to a very small number of philosophical questions, and 

 these the least important and interesting. 



But this uncertainty as to the method is probably not 



