GROWTH AND DIFFUSION OF CRITICAL SPIRIT. 109 



the critical scholar. He can increasino-ly maintain that i5. 



° ■^. Peculiar 



his theories, be they philosophically valid or not, are strengtiim 

 practically useful, that they work, that his methods are *'''*' "*'^"y- 

 at least clear and definite, his path distinctly marked 

 out, his conclusions logically consistent, that his know- 

 ledge is daily increasing, and that, above all, he can 

 foretell in many cases what will happen, discover that 

 which has been hidden, and that the practical applica- 

 tions and triumphs of technical science are the most 

 eloquent testimony to the value of his pursuits, suffic- 

 ing to dispel all critical doubts in the mind of any 

 reasonable person. 



Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the object 

 of scientific research, the facts and processes of nature, 

 are not really accessible to human criticism. Criticism 

 implies a standard from which we can judge the object 

 of our reflection. It further implies that what we 

 criticise might have been different. Now we have le. 



J^esides, 



no standard from which we can judge Nature herself, man cannot 



"^ ^ , judge 



and we have no justification for the assumption that na''"". 

 facts and events in the natural world might have been 

 different from what they are. Nature is simply what 

 she is, and if we attempt to pass judgment upon her 

 phenomena we transcend the limits of natural know- 

 ledge, we import considerations which are foreign to 

 science. Nature may be an oljject of curiosity, of 

 admiration, wonder, or awe ; she is not an object of 

 criticism. Criticism is only possible where we can / ^. 

 apply such categories as true or untrue, good or bad, ' 

 beautiful or ugly, useful or useless. These categories, 

 however, contain a reference to the human mind. Nature 



