238 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



regard to all those questions which refer to the inner 

 life, to the soul. To the historian of philosophy, and 

 still more to the historian of thought, this influence 

 announces itself not only by the appearance of quite a 

 new vocabulary, but also by the altered meaning of 

 older and well - known terms. Nothing is more per- 

 plexing, more difficult to understand, for the student 

 who approaches for the first time the works of the 

 Grerman philosophers, from Kant to Schopenhauer, 

 than the words and phrases which they employ and 

 which lend themselves only awkwardly to a rendering in 

 other modern languages. This new terminology is in 

 itself an indication that we have to do with quite a 

 new body of ideas, that the discussion of all philosophical 

 problems has been moved on to an entirely different 

 plane.^ We shall meet this change of level in the dis- 



^ This point is well brought out 

 by Prof. R. Eucken in his ' Ge- 

 schichte der Philosophischen Termi- 

 nologie,' Leipzig, 1879 : "Especi- 

 ally in the theory of knowledge, 

 that high-water mark of Kantian 

 thought, we find much that is in- 

 dependent. The traditional also is 

 here moved into a new aspect, in 

 particular we may remark, e.g., the 

 following distinctions and opposi- 

 tions : theoretical and practical 

 knowledge, sense and understanding, 

 understanding and reason, empirical 

 and pure intuition, concepts of the 

 understanding and of the reason, 

 analytical and synthetical judg- 

 ments, constitutive and regulative 

 principles, immanent and transcend- 

 ent principles, ' thing in itself ' and 

 appearance, semblance and appear- 

 ance, phenomena and noumena, 

 intellectual and intelligible. In 

 these and in other distinctions we 

 recognise throughout the specific 



diversities of knowledge as a whole ; 

 so far as the substance is concerned 

 we recognise the endeavour to keep 

 tlie subjective and the objective 

 apart. In physics we find the op- 

 position of mechanical and dynami- 

 cal philosophj', of the inorganic and 

 organic, of mechanism and teleology, 

 of internal and external purpose, 

 &c. ; in psychology, the separation 

 of the mechanical and the chemical 

 senses, of efibrt and passion, &c." 

 (p. 146). 



"Kant sometimes adopts notions 

 as he received them by tiadition, 

 brings them into the crucible of his 

 own thought and elaborates them. 

 We have then something that is 

 novel, but a residue remains and 

 a certain discordance is unmis- 

 takable. That Kant, in psychology, 

 starts with much that is taken from 

 Wolff and Tetens, has been fre- 

 quently remarked, but not less is 

 this the case in logic, metaphysic, 



