OF KNOWLEDGE. 299 



the natural history of the human mind, we can never- 

 theless easily recognise how, in modern philosophy, the 

 different theories of knowledge have sprung up under the s. 



Influenc* of 



distinct though frequently unconscious influence of those ciirrent 



a n J literature 



habits and tendencies of thought which, in general and ^"'^ science, 

 scientific literature, were at the time most acceptable and 

 dominating. And in this we may possibly find an ex- 

 planation of the different ways on which leading thinkers 

 have in different periods and countries approached the 

 same problem. The Wissenschaftslehre of Fichte sprang 

 up under the dominant impression of a great change which 

 had recently taken place in men's minds, and which had 

 found a partial expression in Kant's philosophy. But it 

 was not an exclusively academic interest which directed 

 Fichte's earliest speculations. Before he became, as he 

 tells us, accidentally acquainted with Kant's philosophy, 

 he had come under the influence of Lessing's theological 

 polemics in Germany and of the educational interests 

 which emanated from Eousseau in Switzerland. Both 

 produced in him that mental unrest, that " storm and 

 stress" which was common to many other prominent 

 writers and thinkers of the day. He partook, in his • 

 way, of that yearning for liberty in religious belief and 

 social life which was as widespread as it was indefinite. 

 It was the problem of liberty which he tried to solve 

 for himself. Inclined for a moment, under the influence 

 of Spinoza, to adopt the determinist solution, he first 

 found relief and satisfaction in Kant's doctrine of the 

 higher life of the human mind in which it is able to 

 assert its autonomy, or self-imposed law of duty and 

 conduct. At that moment the storm of the Kevolution 



