OF KNOWLEDGE. 



413 



ill the University of Oxford in the place of Mill, and 

 — what is of prime importance — always in conjunction 

 with the Lode of Aristotle.-^ This fusion of two dis- 



troduced aspects gained by a study 

 of Continental thought. The second 

 undertook to elaborate the Hegelian 

 programme on independent lines, a 

 task distinctly formulated already 

 by T. H. Green. For this purpose 

 its representatives studied not so 

 much the historical as the logical 

 foundations of Hegel's system, 

 closely scrutinising what Lotze had 

 already done in that direction, mov- 

 ing fre<[uently in opposition to him, 

 but with him also away from 

 genuine Hegelianism. The former 

 school had taken no notice of Lotze's 

 writings, but subsequently formu- 

 lated its opposition to the drift 

 of his ideas in the first critical 

 attempt which was made in this 

 country to estimate the value of 

 his system as a whole. This 

 was done by Henry Jones in his 

 ' Critical Account of the Philosophy 

 of Lotze' (1895). After criticising 

 in the Preface what others have 

 termed the " theologising " tend- 

 ency of Lotze's thought, he says : 

 " Lotze's investigation of thought 

 has had other and more valuable 

 consequences. It has led modern 

 writers to investigate the nature 

 of thought for themselves, with a 

 result that, particularly in this 

 country, there has been a remark- 

 able development of logical theory 

 on Lotze's own lines. I refer more 

 especially to the logical works of 

 Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet. 

 . . . This development of Lotze's 

 position seems to me to issue in 

 its refutation ; and there are in- 

 dications that the main contribu- 

 tion of Lotze to philosophic 

 thought, the only ultimate con- 

 tribution, consists in deepening 

 that Idealism which he sought to 

 overthrow." (p. xii). The quarrel, 

 then, of the genuine Hegelians 



with Lotze is that "if his view of 

 thought be true, . . . the power 

 of that idealistic reconstruction of 

 belief, which has so strongly influ- 

 enced the modern mind, is entirely 

 broken " (ibid., p. xi). We must 

 be thankful for this clear and 

 concise statement, as it is very 

 helpful in trying to understand 

 the aims of recent philosophical 

 thought as conceived by opposite 

 schools. It also leads us on 

 to the metaphysical problem, of 

 which I shall treat in the next 

 chapter. 



^ The philosophical studies in the 

 University of Oxford would merit a 

 special historical treatment. The 

 only approach to this, so far as I 

 know, is to be found in an article 

 by Prof. Mackenzie in the ' Revue 

 de Metaphysique et de Morale,' 

 which in the year 1908 published 

 a series of articles aiming to re- 

 present the state of philosophic 

 thought in difi'ereut countries. The 

 articles are of value to such readers 

 as have already a fair knowledge of 

 the problems which now occtipy 

 philosophic thought ; but they near- 

 ly all suffer through being over- 

 crowded with names, and exhibit 

 a prevalent tendency of such 

 writings in the present day — the 

 desire to do justice to everybody. 

 They bear testimony to the general 

 inconclusiveness of recent thought. 

 I would suggest to those of my 

 readers who, being outsiders like 

 myself, wish to gain some idea of 

 the position of one prominent side 

 of philosophical thouglit represent- 

 ed in this country by the Univer- 

 sity of Oxford, to read the three 

 articles on Logic contained in the 

 three last editions of the ' Encyclo- 

 piTedia Britannica': the first, by 

 the late Prof. R. Adamson, wa? 



