420 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



r problem of knowledge, at the end of the century, is 

 narrowed down to the distinction between certainty and 

 exactness. 



Up to the middle of the century the conception of 

 exact knowledge grew in importance with the growth 

 and diffusion of the scientific spirit. To many thinkers 

 it may have appeared as if the definiteness and exacti- 

 tude which increasingly characterises natural knowledge 

 curries with it the impress of certitude, and might, in 

 due course, lead to that certainty of conviction which we 

 are seeking to attain in questions of conduct, and as the 

 foundation of a reasoned creed and a system of Morality. 



The later developments of scientific or exact know- 

 ledge, the spread of the mathematical spirit, and the 

 criticism of the foundations of the mathematical and 

 mechanical sciences, have not realised this expectation. 



More and more it has become evident not only that 

 the mechanical view does not satisfy us as an explanation 

 of things, but that its character of being exact, definite, 

 and accurate does not include the feature of certainty. 

 Lotze would call it eine Gemilths-sache ; Kenouvier, une 

 affaire passionelle. 



If knowledge is limited to that which is defined with 

 exactitude, it appears to be doomed to be hypothetical, 

 provisional, and uncertain. 



This forces upon us the conclusion that we must seek 

 for certainty in a different direction, that the foundations 

 of our convictions must lie elsewhere, or that we must 

 extend the meaning of the word Knowledge beyond the 

 narrow and shifting region of that which can be clearly 

 defined. 



