514 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



phases in which the World-Process is developed, the 

 stages of the evolution of the Unknowable Absolute. 

 Lotze, following the later Schelling, would no more see 

 in this mechanically conceived movement of the Abso- 

 lute a solution of the ultimate philosophical problem 

 than he saw it in the logically conceived Triads of Hegel. 

 He believes that the human mind possesses an immediate 

 knowledge of the ultimate Eeality which passes through 

 these mechanical or logical forms of development.-^ 



^ The position which Spencer 

 takes up is so well known and has 

 become so popular that it is un- 

 necessary to give here special refer- 

 ences to passages in his writings in 

 which the doctrine of the Unknow- 

 able is explained. Nevertheless I 

 believe that an attentive perusal 

 of the concluding pages of the first 

 part of ' First Principles ' forms 

 0!ie of the best introductions to the 

 study of philosophy ; further, that 

 a comparison of it with the first 

 thirty-eight pages of Lotze's early 

 ' Metaphysik ' will be one of the 

 best means of introducing the 

 philosophical student to the funda- 

 mental difierence which exists be- 

 tween the two leading tendencies 

 of philosophical thought at the 

 present day. Some of the im- 

 portant arguments for dealing with 

 the metaphysical problem of the 

 truly Real (Lotze) or the Absolute 

 (Spencer) are common to both. 

 But nevertheless the main drift 

 of these arguments is entirely 

 different. According to Lotze, and 

 more or less according to all 

 thinkers who represent the same 

 tendency of tliought, the idea of 

 the truly Real is formed by a 

 process of gradual adaptation of 

 defmite notions and terms of 

 language for the purpose of ex- 

 pressing a deep-lying thought which 

 the human mind desires to fix ; for 

 this the soul is considered to pos- 

 sess an immediate sense, it has 



a definite meaning and is the 

 subject of supremest interest, 

 being as such the pivot upon 

 which all moral distinctions turn. 

 " There must exist a principle of 

 certitude according to which we 

 are able to decide as to the correct- 

 ness of any result of our reasoning. 

 . . . We must assume that philo- 

 sophy does not create the rules for 

 this decision, but that the whole 

 soul is present with a sense of that 

 verity which it possesses and prac- 

 tises before it scientifically explains 

 it. Wherever we wish to deter- 

 mine something unknown through 

 definite terms, we make the tacit 

 assumption that vee must in some 

 way be able to know what notions 

 are expressive of it and what not ; 

 in case this judgment were im- 

 possible, the possibility of an investi- 

 gation would vanish. The internal 

 nature of the content we are in 

 search of, whilst yet unknown to 

 us, is not present in separate 

 definitions of thought, but exist- 

 ing, as it does, in the form of a 

 meaning, it nevertheless possesses 

 implicitly a defensive power to 

 reject that which is not adequate 

 to it. ... By rejecting what is 

 inadequate and negating false de- 

 terminations it gains in content 

 itself, . . . acquiring for our con- 

 sciousness in this way a positive ex- 

 pression of its own essence. This is 

 the simple nature of every process 

 of thought which, through defining 



