OF REALITY. 617 



affirmation, and that it is of no use and contributes 

 nothing towards a comprehension of the phenomenal 

 world ; and that with Wundt no outlying or underlying 

 conception exists at all, but that any conception which we 

 may form as to the essence of Eeality is merely a highest 

 abstraction resulting from the analysis of the ] phenomenal 

 world. But both Spencer and Wundt mark in a certain 

 way an advance upon Lotze, inasmuch as they have 

 a greater appreciation for the processes of development, 

 both having assimilated the leading ideas of Darwinism, 

 towards which in fact Spencer himself furnished large 

 and important contributions. With both these philo- 

 sophers we are inclined to think that the historical 

 process of development, an insight into the becoming of 

 things, very largely takes the place of an insight into 

 their being. With Wundt, indeed, the idea of an under- 

 lying substance is entirely discarded ; the nature or 

 essence of things is a process. The Absolute, which 

 played such a great part in the systems of Schelling 

 and Hegel, which, with Lotze, is conceived as something 

 of intrinsic value or worth, and which, with Spencer, has 

 retired into the background as an unknowable some- 

 thing, has entirely disappeared out of the sphere of ideas 

 in which Wundt's speculation moves. There is also no 

 doubt that for many thinking persons a historical account 

 which connects existing phenomena with the past appears 

 to be an explanation of the nature and essence of those 

 phenomena and satisfies their spirit of curiosity and in- 

 quiry. Lotze always regarded this manner of looking 

 at Eeality as insufficient. 



