OF REALITY. 539 



constructive thinkers. The belief which lived in the 

 latter was that the human mind was somehow capable 

 of an elevation into that higher region of thought where 

 it would gain an immediate intuitive knowledge of the 

 underlying ground and essence of things — i.e., of the 

 truly Eeal. The classical expression of this way of 

 thinking is Hegel's ' Phenomenology of the Mind.' 

 Philosophers in Germany have now mostly settled 

 down to a conviction that this endeavour of the 

 idealistic school was illusory. What remnant of truth 

 it contains survives only in the deeper-lying premises 

 of Lotze's philosophy such as I have indicated above, 

 and the resemblance of which with some of Mr Bradley's 

 teachings I shall have another opportunity of more fully 

 pointing out. 



But the more we leave the purely formal side of Mr 

 Bradley's speculations, the less does it seem as if his 

 conception stood in any agreement with the positive 

 ideas of Lotze's philosophy. As stated before, one of 

 Lotze's most characteristic conceptions is the distinction 

 which he emphasises between the world of forms, the 

 world of things, and the world of values. This dis- 

 tinction has frequently been understood as implying in 

 Lotze's philosophy an intrinsic dualism or pluralism. 

 However this may be, it is quite clear that Mr Bradley 

 dues not countenance any such distinction. " I do not," 

 he says,^ " mean that, beside our inadequate idea of 

 truth, we should set up, also and alongside, an inde- 

 pendent standard of worth. For . . . our two standards 

 would tend everywhere to clash. They would collide 



^ ' Appearance and Reality,' p. 333. 



