OF NATURE. 



589 



formula which contrasted the phenomenal and the 

 noumenal worlds, the " Thing in itself " and its appear- 

 ance. The main object and root of his philosophy was 

 to define the " Thing in itself," and this he did by 

 identifying it with the Will. And he still further 

 emphasised and perpetuated this contrast by placing in 

 opposition the Will and the Intellect, as the two funda- 

 mental principles or factors in all reality. In the sequel 

 he certainly did utilise the discoveries and theories of 

 the rapidly progressing natural sciences as illustrations 

 of his main thesis, and in the tract referred to, " The 

 Will in Nature," he arrived at a philosophy of nature 

 and a conception of her innermost essence. 



Still Schopenhauer belonged to the idealistic and 33. 



Schopuii- 



roraantic school of modern philosophy and retained |jf"a,^[g^°o^ 

 many of the prejudices and preconceptions with which r°"i*"'^"=- 

 that school started, as also that supreme belief in the 



nothing but the name in common 

 with Schopenhauer's Will. Not less 

 is Fichte in the fundamental traits 

 of his philosophy rationalistically 

 inclined, and in addition much more 

 than Kant teleologically minded. 

 Indeed, without exaggeration, we 

 may say that his system is the most 

 consistent attempt to explain with- 

 out remainder what is by what ouf/ht 

 to be. . . . The Self (or ego) is for 

 Fichte essentially a rationally de- 

 termined function, its real essence 

 being rational and moral determina- 

 tion. . . . With Schopenhauer, on 

 the other side, it seems at first 

 problematical how moral categories 

 can be applied at all to the blind 

 and aimless Will which appears 

 most directly in the forces of 

 inoi-ganic nature" (p. 285). Dr 

 Lehmann then shows how, so far 

 as the ethical problem is concerned, 



the way was indicated to Schopen- 

 hauer by Schelling's tract (1809) on 

 the '' Essence of human freedom," 

 which Schopenhauer praised as an 

 excellent paraphrase of Kantian 

 doctrine in which, however, Schel- 

 ling did not give Kant his due. 

 "We shall revert to this when deal- 

 ing in a subsequent chapter with 

 the Ethical problem. It should 

 be noted that Schopenhauer's in- 

 troduction to the idealistic philo- 

 sophy came through Schulze in 

 Gottingen and Fichte in Berlin, 

 at a time (1809-1813) long after 

 Fichte's separation from Schelling, 

 whose philosophy of nature lay 

 outside Schopenhauer's course of 

 studies. His interest in physical 

 and pliysiological questions was 

 probably awakened by Goethe, who, 

 in 1814, secured Schopenhauer's 

 interest in his own colour theorv. 



