OF NATUEE. 621 



sary connection of cause and effect — i.e., of antecedent 

 and consequent, but quite as much upon the conception 

 of finaUty — i.e., of a definite end or ends. For the em- 

 ployment of the category of causaHty alone reveals to us 

 in nature merely numberless series of connected pheno- 

 mena ; it does not deal with the interconnection of 

 these series themselves in a comprehensive scheme.^ 

 We require indeed not only regularities but also a 

 harmony among these separate regularities. Now, har- 

 mony implies a reference to an ensemble, or together, 

 or a whole ; in the end, to the totality of things. 

 It is therefore only through some conception refer- 

 ring to the whole or totality of things that we can 

 satisfy the inherent requisite of thought — viz., to bring 

 unity and order into our view of nature. It is quite 

 true that this reference to the whole of nature which is 

 identical with that of finality cannot be subjected to 

 the rigorous methods by which we establish the geo- 

 metrical arrangements and changes in space and time ; 

 it rests upon an anticipation with which we approach 

 the phenomena of nature. " Nature is," as Lachelier 

 says, " at once, a science, which never leaves off de- 

 ducing effects from causes, and an art, which without 

 end exercises itself in new inventions ; and if it is given 

 to us, in some instances, to follow by calculation a uni- 

 form progress of that science which works at the 

 foundation of things, induction properly understood 

 consists rather in divining, by a kind of instinct, 

 the varying processes of the art which plays on the 



^ We may perhaps say that 

 causality alone would reduce our 

 image of nature to a bundle of 



threads, or at best a texture, 

 which would give us no picture 

 full of life and colour. 



