.RABIES. 153 



bitten by a mad dog, ought either to have been at once destroyed, or so 

 secured that it was impossible for him to do mischief. 



Lord Kenyon observed to the jury, that this was one of those causes 

 which came home to the feelings of all, yet must not be carried farther 

 than justice demanded. A cause like this never, perhaps, before occurred in 

 a court of justice ; but there had been many resembling it in point of prin- 

 ciple. If a dog, known to be ill-tempered and vicious, did any person an 

 injury without provocation, there could be no question that the owner of 

 the dog was answerable, in a court of justice, for the injury inflicted. 

 Here was a worse case. The dog by whom the child was bitten had been 

 attacked by another that was undeniably rabid. His master was aware of 

 rhis, and placed him in a state of partial confinement a confinement so 

 lax, and so inefficient, that this poor child had broken through it, and 

 was bitten and died. What other people would have done in such a situ- 

 ation he could not tell ; but, if he were asked what he would do, he 

 i nswered, he certainly would kill the dog. however much of a favourite he 

 had been, because no atonement was within the reach of his fortune to 

 make to the injured party for such a dreadful visitation of Providence as 

 this. It was not enough for the owner of such a dog to say, he took pre- 

 caution to prevent mischief: he ought to have made it impossible that 

 mischief could happen ; and, therefore, as soon as there was any reason- 

 able suspicion that the dog was rabid, he ought to have destroyed him. 



But, if the owner wished to save the animal, until he was satisfied of the 

 actual state of the case, he ought to have secured him, so that every indi- 

 vidual might be safe. Whether the defendant thought he had done all 

 that was necessary, his lordship did not know ; but this he knew, that 

 the dog was not perfectly secured, otherwise this misfortune could not 

 have happened. 



The care which the defendant took in this case was not enough, and, 

 therefore, he had no doubt that this action was maintainable. The jury 

 ^ ould judge what damages they ought to give. He would refer this to 

 their feelings. They could not avoid commiserating the distress of the 

 family of this poor man. He should, however, observe to the jury, that 

 they must not give vindictive damages ; but still he did not think that 

 damages merely to the amount of 6/. or 7, which was stated to be the 

 expense of the funeral, (fee., would at all meet the justice of the case. He 

 was inclined to advise them to go beyond that, although he did not plead 

 vindictive damages. There would be costs to be defrayed by the 

 plaintiff, well known in the profession under the head of "extra costs," 

 e\ en although he had a verdict. If the verdict had been at his disposal, 

 he would have taken care that these costs should have been borne by the 

 party that had been the cause of the injury. That appeared to him to be 

 th-a justice of the case. 



He trusted that none who heard him would doubt his sincerity, when he 

 said, he lamented the misfortune which had given birth to this action ; 

 ani, with that qualification of the case, he must say that he was not sorry 

 that this action had been brought. He thanked the plaintiff for bringing 

 it ; for it might be of public benefit. It would teach a lesson that would 

 non soon be forgotten, " That a person, who knowingly keeps a vicious, 

 dangerous animal, should be considered to be answerable for all the acts 

 of that animal." There were instances in which very large damages had 

 been given to repair such injuries. He did not say that the present case 



