Machinery of Self-control. 701 



on touch, in the convolutions of the mesial surface constituting the fal- 

 ciform lobe, and perhaps the hippocampus ; those on smell and taste, in 

 the hippocampal lobule, or subiculum. (See figs. 366, 367.) 



CHAPTER LXV1. 



MACHINERY OF SELF-CONTROL,. 



Carpenter classifies the motive powers which govern or dictate human 

 action, under three heads. ( 1 ) Previously acquired habits which auto- 

 matically incite us to do as we have been before accustomed to do un- 

 der like circumstances, with little or no interference from motives of 

 pleasure or pain, or ideas of right or wrong. Since actions done under 

 the dictation of habit are done easily and without attention, friction, or 

 wearing effort, we naturally and automatically fall into their perform- 

 ance. The moral of this is, contract only good and useful habits. 

 Corolla^ : Educate the youth by the establishment of habits, moral, 

 industrial, intellectual, &c. ( 2 ) " Emotional states, which incite us to 

 particular actions by the expectation of gratification eitheV in the act it- 

 self or in some consequence which our reason leads us to anticipate 

 from it, or by the expectation of pain if the act be not performed. " 

 Certainly the greater part of our voluntary actions are dictated in part 

 or whole by motives which involve a greater or less number of emotional 

 and personal elements. ( 3 ) " Notions of right and of duty, which so 

 far as they attach themselves to our actions, give them a moral and re- 

 ligious character. " It is evident upon reflection that there can be no 

 notions of "right and duty " which do not involve considerations relat- 

 ing to self, or, in other words, elements of an emotional and personal 

 nature. So that this class of motives is, in the first instance, only a 

 subdivision of the second class. But it may happen that in the habit- 

 ual practice of the actions of this class, the personal and selfish motives 

 become obscured and lost to view, and then there is nothing but the 

 habit left, and the motive is reduced to one of the first class. In real- 

 ity, then, we may say there are but two classes of motives ; the first 

 and second, as above. 



In the great majority of moral actions, as they are taught us in our 

 youth, the selfish element is ignored. They are enforced upon us in the 

 first place by authority, and kept before our attention until they become 

 matters of habit ; the only reason assigned as an apology for their ex- 

 istence Is that they are founded upon. " duty. " This serves to silence 

 inquiry when it does not satisfy it. Once arrived at the habit of enter- 

 taining moral feelings, and practicing moral acts, moral character be- 

 comes an instinct and a feature of hereditary transmission. Thus, we 



