Machinery of Self-control. 705 



these motives, MIX! their assertion involves a concealment and control <>f 

 other motives and of their expressions. 



We often hear of a struggle between policy and principle, and actions 

 are performed upon policy which are said to be contrary to principle, 

 and vice versa. It has been observed that a principle is a standard with 

 which to compare and co-ordinate new sensations. In order that such 

 comparison should result, it is essential that the new sensation shall 

 possess parts which sustain a particular sort of relationship to each 

 other. For example, we have a principle handed down to us from the 

 past, and erected in our brains by education and precept, that it is im- 

 moral to lie. No other sort of an action, except the telling of an un- 

 truth, can be tried by this standard. Now, in comparing every case of 

 lying which comes to our knowledge, with our standard, a little reflec- 

 tion suffices to show that equally the standard is tried by the action. In 

 saying that lying is immoral, we are, practically, comparing a number 

 of cases of lying with another and primary standard that of morality. 

 And we are then compelled to seek the elements which determine what 

 morality is. As we shall see further on, we call those acts of other 

 people moral which we suppose will not detract from our happiness, and 

 they judge our acts in the same way, and so the standard of morality 

 has been practically agreed upon. Now, in order to establish that lying 

 is immoral, a great many cases of lying must have been considered with 

 reference to their effect on the peace and happiness of men, and the ef- 

 fect having been found in general to be unfavorable, the resultant of the 

 sum of the sensations of all the experiences of lies ever had, is expressed 

 in the formula : it is immoral to lie. But this is only a resultant, and 

 represents the influence of the weightiest considerations. It expresses 

 the tendency or effect of the majority of lies, but not necessarily of all. 

 Each fresh lie may be compared with the principal standard which de- 

 termines morality by determining happiness, and then it may be com- 

 pared secondari^ with the principle which asserts a lie to be immoral. 

 If this particular lie tends to produce happiness instead of the contrary, 

 it is in accordance with moral principle, although it violates the subor- 

 dinate principle, and calls it in question. Evidently, if the majority of 

 lies in the experience of mankind were lies of benevolence, the subor- 

 dinate principle would never have been formulated as it is. This par- 

 ticular lie, then, which is under consideration, being found, as supposed, 

 to promote happiness, it tries the principle, and, as far as its influence 

 goes, tends to modify it. The fact that it does so, tends to show the 

 composite and mechanical structure of the principle. A principle, then, 

 may be described to consist of the sum of the condensations of a num- 

 ber of similar and homogeneous sensations or ideas associated together 

 in one mass, as if superposed one upon another in such a wa}- that a 



