Conscience, and the Moral Sense. 727 



character in order to make them more binding, are, with savage tribes, 

 of the most absolute and imperative sort, as, for example, the taboo 

 formerly among the Pacific Islanders. Then there are the customs of 

 caste, as among the Hindoos. The customs of the more enlightened 

 races are almost equally rigid in some particulars, while they are more 

 liberal and rational in others. In some savage tribes, where it would 

 be a shocking fault to eat with a woman, it is no breach of etiquette to 

 go naked, while in a civilized commimit}^ to appear in public naked 

 would subject a person to a term in prison or a lunatic asylum. 



The influences of our social life have thus made their marks upon us, 

 and stamped our brains full of the organs of these standards of duty 

 toward others. Whenever our acts are in harmony with these standards, 

 the resulting sensation is agreeable, and it is a sensation of duty per- 

 formed. When our acts antagonize these standards, the resulting sen- 

 sation is one of inharmony and uneasiness. The general class of sen- 

 sations arising from the agitation of these moral organs, is denominated 

 conscience. Conscience, then, constituting a certain definite restricted 

 class of sensations, is a subdivision of consciousness, under which term 

 are included all sensations of every sort. When sensations arise from 

 actions in harmony with these standard organs, they are agreeable, and 

 we say conscience is satisfied, or conscience approves. When the action 

 1 is inharmonious, tending to wear down and disrupt the standard organ, 

 the effect in sensation is painful, and we express it by saying our con- 

 science checks or stings us, or brings us remorse. The principle in- 

 volved is the same set forth in chapter 65. The violation of any habit 

 is productive of uneasiness, which is in proportion to the intensity of 

 the habit and the intimacy and number of its associations with other 

 habits. The consciences of some people are very tender, and easily 

 hurt, while others are tough and elastic. 



As the drill and education by which the organs of moral sense are 

 differentiated, are by no means infallible, it follows that the organs may 

 stand for a factitious or made-up state of things which does not exist in 

 reality but only in the teachings we have received ; so that with the 

 most sensitive conscience one may have totally false ideas of duty. 

 Conscience is therefore no sure guide, and tends to keep us in the old 

 tracks even after we have every reason to believe them wrong. 



The ideas we have of good and bad, right and wrong, &c. , are de- 

 rived from sensations enjoyed or suffered. Those things are good the 

 stimulations from which fit into our already differentiated cerebral or- 

 gans in such harmonious manner as to produce agreeable sensations. 

 Bad things are those which produce unpleasant sensations. In order 

 that we may have such ideas, it is not essential that we should have ac- 

 tually experienced all the possible sensations. We may get the ideas 



