The "Will. 747 



CHAPTER LXX. 



THE WILL.. 



Dr. Sam. Johnson said, ' < We feel that our will is free, and that's the 

 end on't. " When a little dog sees his reflection in a glass for the first 

 time, he feels very sure it is another little dog. Our sensations, it is 

 true, are all we have to go by, and yet a single unverified sensation may 

 fool us badly. Before it is entitled to full credence and influence, it 

 must be tried by its peers in the shape of other sensations. If they all 

 agree, we are bound to accept the verdict. They are not all agreed that 

 the will is free, as we shall see. 



Carpenter, too, who has many excellent suggestions on this subject, 

 which I shall freely quote, nevertheless gives himself away by the re- 

 markable confession ' 'That the scientific investigation of the nature and 

 source of the will ' ' has seemed to lead to results which are inconsistent 

 with our intuitive conviction of freedom as well as with our scarcely 

 less intuitive notion of moral responsibility. " That < ' scientific investi- 

 gation " leads to such results, ought, it would seem, to cause some dis- 

 trust of these subjective or supposed "intuitive" notions. That it of- 

 ten does not, is evidence of the singular perseverance of habit in thought. 

 In regard to the freedom of the will, what our conviction really amounts 

 to, is, that when the will is formed for the movement of a muscle, such 

 movement will take place. From the observed uniformity of the result 

 we ought rather to argue its necessity than its freedom. 



One says, < ' See ! I can move my hand and bring it to rest, as I 

 please." How? < < By simply willing to doit." The language shows 

 the necessity of the hand to move when "I please," and also indicates 

 the will itself as following the " I please, "as a term in a series of three, 

 I please, will, and muscle movement. The position of the will in this 

 series indicates its contingent and conditional nature. If the pleasure 

 is different, the will is different. We are apt to confound the will and 

 the pleasure as one, but it is easy to show that in reality they are two, 

 and that the pleasure must precede the will, and if there is no pleasure 

 no will is formed. Pleasure is simply a general name for a class of 

 sensations, and sensations are the immediate or remote result of sensory 

 stimulations. The will is therefore under the domination of sensory 

 stimulations, and these in turn depend upon the environment. 



Will merely determines the result, but is not concerned in the selec- 

 tion and combination of the muscular movements necessary to bring 

 this result about. Thus, a child can raise his eyelids ( if he have a mo- 

 tive to do so ) but he cannot tell whether in so doing he contracts one 



