The Will. 767 



any condition in which the general run of motives do not arouse sensa- 

 tion in him, and so are inoperative in his case. We hold men morally 

 responsible to the extent we perceive them to be under the restraint of 

 cerebral motives. 



Infants, idiots, the insane, the drunk, the untaught, &c. , we perceive 

 are incompetent to be controlled by the motives which govern those of 

 mature and clear intellect, and so we say they are not responsible to those 

 motives, and in governing those classes we endeavor to supply motives 

 which will restrain them. If they have intellect enough to be instructed, 

 we admonish them and let them go. If not, we punish them and let them 

 go. If the memory of these things is enough to keep them straight, we 

 say they are able to restrain themselves, and that they are responsible to 

 these motives of memory, or they are morally responsible. If such mo- 

 tives do not control them, we lock them up ; they are not morally responsible, 

 that is, no motives can be erected in their brain which are sufficient to con- 

 trol them, so we control them by physical force and make them responsible 

 to that alone. Under all circumstances they are bound. The free alone, if 

 there were any such, could be accounted to be irresponsible. No condi- 

 tioned being can be free; there can be, therefore, no irresponsibility in na- 

 ture. The feeling of responsibility which is possessed by man and all the 

 other animals which have a cerebrum and a memory, is proof that they 

 are not free. It is singular that the sense of responsibility which we feel, 

 should have been taken by anybody as a proof of our freedom. The 

 sense of responsibility is a sense of obligation to do something or to leave 

 something undone. It is an emotional sense and connects itself with va- 

 rious memory organs which express intimate relations of outward things to 

 ourselves. It is a sense which results from a perception of the way in 

 which certain external conditions will affect us with reference to our com- 

 fort or discomfort, pleasure or pain, happiness or unhappiness. It is 

 the sensation of a state or condition of the brain which follows such per- 

 ception, and precedes the will, the condition, and of course the sensation, 

 of it disappearing when a will is formed as a sequel to it. In other 

 words, this condition of the brain occurs in the great majority of cases 

 in which a motor will is formed and is then an element in its formation. 

 The sensation of it is a sensation of a striking of the balance of motives 

 and of the imminent presence among them of motives of personal lia- 

 bility and penalty. 



The sense of responsibility is closely allied to the sense of duty, which 

 was mentioned in chapter 68 ; undoubtedly the sense of duty could have 

 arisen, in the first place, only in connection with a sense of penalt}^ or loss 

 for neglected duty. But the practice and sentiment of duty might, after 

 much repetition, Become a matter of habit and finally a mattev of in- 

 stinct, and its originating cause be lost sight of. Thus, watch dogs, 



