The Will. 769 



have been different. But after all motives from external and internal 

 senses have had their influence in forming the will, we are then conscious 

 it could not be different; our sense of freedom vanishes, and we feel 

 ourselves in the grasp of an iron necessity that we cannot escape or will 

 to escape, because all the motives are concentrated in the formation of 

 that very iron necessity, the final purpose, and no antagonizing will is 

 possible. Luther said, " Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise." He 

 knew he could not because he felt there were no unconsidered motives 

 in the background that could disturb the will already formed. And so 

 we all feel in the presence of a purpose which we know to be final. We 

 cannot do otherwise. 



It is often said that we have no right to hold others responsible for 

 their acts or to punish them for wrong doing unless they are free. But 

 if we give this a little attention, it will be seen that we hold men respon- 

 sible, not in proportion to the degree in which we suppose them to be 

 free, but in proportion to the value of the motives to which they are ex- 

 posed and by which they are actuated according to our estimate of that 

 value as a binding force. Thus, if an insane man commits a theft, we 

 say he is not responsible, and we excuse him, because we recognize that 

 the ordinary motives which compel men to be honest are absent and do 

 not dominate his life. So far as these motives go, he is free. He steals 

 then because he is at liberty to do so, and though we do not blame him, 

 nevertheless we proceed to stop him by curtailing that liberty ; and if 

 we cannot furnish moral restraint which will make him feel that he is 

 not at liberty to steal, we place him in confinement where he will see that 

 he is not. When a sane man steals, it is evident that he, too, has too 

 much freedom from the compulsion of moral motives, and we put him 

 in confinement, but for a purpose somewhat different. Imprisonment 

 in the case of the insane man is only for physical restraint, and will last 

 indefinitely as long as the man is insane. In the case of the sane thief, 

 it is for such specified term, as in the opinion of the law or the honorable 

 court, will be required to erect moral restraints in the man's brain. If 

 the man behaves himself after this, we say he has come under the in- 

 fluence of moral motives. And we thus define moral motives to be the 

 restraints imposed against the performance of certain acts by the mem- 

 ory of unpleasant results associated with them. In thus supplying arti- 

 ficial stimuli to form the will, we are imitating nature and giving an ob- 

 ject lesson like those learned by our ancestors before the advent of moral 

 instincts. Our punishments are founded upon the fact that all restraints 

 are painful, and they are designed to afford to the culprit a memory of 

 pain greater than the pain of the restraint of the crimal acts. But we 

 often learn to do the correct thing empirically without being able to give 

 logical or scientific reasons for it. Men have been punished, and prop- 



