Reason and Invention. 843 



The automatic action sometim'es originates when there is no apparent 

 external stimulus, the immediate stimulus being a memory of a former 

 impression, or a new mental state brought about by the condensation 

 and co-ordination of several former impressions. This is perhaps the 

 most realty automatic cerebral action, but it is obvious that this action 

 is not essentially different from the other ; the pause or break that takes 

 place between the incoming of the external stimulus and the outgoing 

 of the motor stimulus, is occupied by invisible, intangible and uncon- 

 scious operations, which are the necessaiy links in the chain of causa- 

 tion from the original sensory impression to the final motor action. 

 Automatic action may therefore be properly defined to be delayed and 

 modified reflex action. The greater the delay, the more automatic it 

 appears. 



The cerebrum is indeed the reflection and representative of the < ' with- 

 out. " It has been well named the microcosm, for it possesses in its struc- 

 ture the potentiality of reflecting the nervous equivalent of every ray of 

 energy which has been darted upon it from the macrocosm without. 

 And its reflected energy is directed upon the same motor centers, which, 

 during its inactivity, are moved 'directly (reflexly) by the stimuli from 

 the environing macrocosm. 



I have in this chapter taken no account of the telepathic sense, or the 

 telepathic acquirement of ideas ( the subject of chap. 79 ), because an 

 idea injected into the brain by telepathy becomes a part of the sum of 

 environing stimuli domiciled there, the same, as a sermon poured in at 

 the ear, or a printed tale, or an acted drama taken in at the eye. It 

 matters not to my argument how much we may be influenced by tele- 

 pathic stimulations, or whether we are influenced by them at all. The 

 actions resulting from such influence would be ours in the same sense 

 that actions influenced by an eloquent oration would be, or for that matter, 

 by any other motive big or little, worthy or unworthy. It does not 

 alter the case of the automatism of our action whether it be instigated 

 by a Zeus or Daemon outside of us, or the potent suggestions of an 

 empty stomach inside. 



CHAPTER LXXVI. 



REASON AND INVENTION. 



In studying the nature and essence >i Reason, we need not look for 

 any principles in addition to those already set forth. All nervous and 

 cerebral action is merely the continuation of motion begun in some form 

 in the environment, and continued through the organism* modified by 

 the reaction of the internal sense organs or other parts of the nervous 



