ON COMMON NOTIONS OP PROBABILITY. 115 



nearly equal, much exceed in number all the rest put 

 together ; thirdly, by showing that there can be no 

 possible reason for an excess of white, which does not 

 equally, by express condition of the question, apply in fa- 

 vour of an excess of black. The last is more unanswer- 

 able than convincing ; the second really shows that the 

 event which we propose and treat as one event, namely, 

 " as many white as black, or nearly so," is, in fact, a 

 collection of a large number of events, much exceeding 

 in number all the rest which can happen. It is as if, 

 having a million of possible cases, I separated nine 

 hundred thousand from the rest, called each of them A, 

 and each of the rest B, and then asserted that A would 

 happen more often than B. But, nevertheless, I sus- 

 pect that to the first mode of demonstration, actual 

 experiment, most persons owe that degree of con- 

 fidence in the theory, which (often without knowing 

 it) they exhibit in the affairs of life ; and I derive 

 such a suspicion from observing that every result of the 

 theory of probabilities which is not of a nature to admit 

 of e very-day confirmation, or which would escape an 

 inattentive observer, is looked upon with distrust. In 

 no case is this more obvious than in the prevailing 

 notions with regard to luck. 



It is observed that some people always have luck at 

 cards. The order of things seems disturbed at their 

 caprice ; if they sit opposite to the dealer at whist, then 

 there is always an undue proportion of trumps among 

 the cards which come second, sixth, tenth, &c., up to 

 the fiftieth; while, when they become before the dealer 

 Hocus Pocus (for to no other spirit, ancient or 

 modern, can the agency be attributed) puts all the 

 good cards, third, seventh, eleventh, &c. The fact is 

 stated as a sort of mystery, and we hear of people 

 who are always lucky at cards and never at dice, or 

 vice versa. The statement implies that the parties who 

 make it believe there is something in luck an asser- 

 tion which I do not think of questioning; for, as I 

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