GENERALISATION OP LAWS. 63 



purely rational conception of the universe, founded on princi- 

 ples of speculative philosophy, would no doubt assign to the 

 science of the Cosmos a still more elevated aim. I am far 

 from blaming efforts which I have not myself attempted, 

 solely because their success hitherto has been extremely 

 doubtful. Contrary to the wishes and counsels of those 

 profound and powerful thinkers who have given new life to 

 speculations belonging to antiquity, systems of a philosophy 

 of nature have in our country (Germany) turned men's 

 minds for a time from the graver studies of the mathemati- 

 cal and physical sciences. The intoxication of supposed ' 

 conquests already achieved, a novel and extravagantly sym- 

 bolical language, a predilection for formulse of scholastic 

 reasoning more contracted than were ever known to the 

 middle ages, have, through the youthful abuse of noble 

 powers, characterised the short saturnalia of a purely ideal 

 science of nature. I say abuse of powers, for superior 

 minds, which have embraced both speculative studies and 

 the experimental sciences, took no part in these saturnalia. 

 The results obtained by serious investigations in the path of 

 induction, cannot be at variance with a true philosophy of 

 nature. If there is contradiction, the fault must be either 

 in the unsoundness of the speculation, or in the exaggerated 

 pretensions of empiricism, which thinks that it has proved by 

 its experiments more than is really deducible from them. 



The natural world may be opposed to the intellec- 

 tual, or nature to art, taking the latter term in its higher 

 sense as embracing the manifestations of the intellectual 

 power of man ; but these distinctions (which are indicated 

 in the most polished languages) must not be suffered to 



lead to such a separation of the domain of physics from that 

 VOL. i. <* 



