ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SUGAR. 11 



the continent. The present bounty in Germany is about ic per Ib on all sugar pro- 

 duced and an additional export bounty of over ic per Ib on raw and more than ic per 

 Ib on refined sugar. Direct bounties paid the European sugar producer in 1894 

 amounted to more than $25,000,000. 



The average rate of duty imposed on raw sugar by the eight European nations 

 named below is now 4.86c per Ib, almost as much as the United States' war tariff of 5c 

 per Ib. The most that has been suggested for American sugar, including both duty 

 and bounty, is only one-half the present European duty. 



In the earlier years of our government the duty on sugar varied from 2i to 5c per 

 Ib. Of late years, the policy of the United States toward sugar has been as follows, 

 and the present duties on sugar imposed by certain foreign countries are also given : 

 Table D RATES OF DUTY ON BEST GRADES OF IMPORTED SUGAR (in cents per Ib). 



UNITED STATES. PRESENT DUTIES IMPOSED BY OTHER COUNTRIES. 



1861, 5 cents per pound, Germany, 3.9 to 4.75 cents per pound, 



1862, 4 cents per pound, Austria-Hungary, 3.9 to 4.11 cents per pound, 

 1864, 5 cents per pound, Belgium, 3.94 to 4. 36 cents per pound, 



1870, 4 cents per pound, Holland, 4.8 cents per pound, 



1874, 5 cents per pound, Russia, 6.6 to 8.88 cents per pound, 



1883, 2Vs to 3V 2 cents per pound, Italy, 5.25 to 8.35 cents per pound, 



1890, V 2 c duty, bounty on domestic sugar 2c per Ib, Spain, 4% cents on foreign, 

 1894, 40 per cent ad valorem, Spain, 2.94 cents on colonial, 



France, 6 to 7.45 cents per pound. 



The highest figures tor the United States are for refined sugar, but raws constitute the bulk of 

 imports. In the figures for foreign countries the smaller amount is for raw and the larger amount 

 for refined sugar. 



AS TO STATE BOUNTIES. 



These have been tried in Utah and Nebraska, but a bounty offered by the state 

 has proved to be an ephemeral thing. It has lasted only from one to three years and 

 in no case has proven to be perfectly satisfactory to either the state treasury, the 

 public, or the farmers or manufacturers directly interested in the sugar industry. 

 It is urged against state bounties that they give an artificial stimulus to the business 

 that is not conducive to substantial development or to the best results in field or 

 factory. 



The general opinion favors appropriate protection against foreign competition for 

 a sufficient term of years to give our domestic industry a fair chance. The investment 

 required is so large that capitalists will not go into the industry unless there is rea- 

 sonable assurance of its being successful for a long term of years. This hinges on 

 protection against foreign competition, rather than upon any little aid for a year or 

 two that might be given by a state bounty. 



Moreover, the state bounties encourage the industry in one state of course more 

 than in another. Protection or direct aid in the form of bounties should be national 

 in scope. Then each and every state will be on the same footing and the industry 

 will naturally develop along substantial lines in those sections that offer the best nat- 

 ural inducements to its permanent success. 



WILL PROTECTION ENHANCE THE PRICE OF SUGAR TO DOMESTIC CONSUMERS? 



No. Recent experience and the present status of the industry go to show that 

 with proper protection there will be such an increase in the production of domestic 

 sugar that, with the large imports which will continue, the market will be so well sup- 



