xiii.] THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION. 333 



Nor is it possible that the idea of outness (in the 

 sense of discontinuity with the sentient body) could be 

 attained by such a person ; for, as we have seen, every 

 tactile sensation is referred to a point either of the 

 natural sensory surface itself, or of some solid in con^ 

 tinuity with that surface. Hence it would appear that 

 the conception of the difference between the Ego and 

 the non-Ego could not be attained by a man thus 

 situated. His feelings would be his universe, and his 

 tactile sensations his " moenia niundi." Time would 

 exist for him as for us, but space would have only two 

 dimensions. 



But now remove the paralysis from the motor appa- 

 ratus, and give the palm of the hand of our imaginary 

 man perfect freedom to move, so as to be able to glide 

 in all directions over the bodies with which it is in con- 

 tact. Then with the consciousness of that mobility, the 

 notion of space of three dimensions which is " JRaum" 

 or " room " to move with perfect freedom is at once 

 given. But the notion that the tactile surface itself 

 moves, cannot be given by touch alone, which is com- 

 petent to testify only to the fact of change of place, not 

 to its cause. The idea of the motion of the tactile 

 surface could not, in fact, be attained, unless the idea 

 of change of place were accompanied by some state of 

 consciousness, which does not exist when the tactile sur- 

 face is immoveable. This state of consciousness is what 

 is termed the muscular sense, and its existence is very 

 easily demonstrable. 



Suppose the back of my hand to rest upon a table, 

 and a sovereign to rest upon the upturned palm, I at 

 once acquire a notion of extension, and of the limit of 

 that extension. The impression made by the circular 

 piece of gold is quite different from that which would 

 be made by a triangular, or a square, piece of the same 



