106 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSATION. 



pheres being simply that action of the mind excites 

 their action, and that their action excites that of 

 the mind. 1 That presumption prepares the way 

 for the hypothesis of sensation which I venture to 

 suggest, which is this : that the consciousness extends 

 from its special seat so far as there is continuity 

 of the impressed condition ; that when an irritation 

 is applied to a nerve-extremity in a finger or else- 

 where, the impression (or rather impressed con- 

 dition) travels as is generally understood, but 

 exists for at least a moment along the whole 

 length of the nerve, and that as soon as there is 

 continuity of the impressed condition from finger 

 to brain the consciousness is in connection with 

 the nerve and is directly aware of the irritation 

 at the nerve-extremity. Or the position, may be 

 shortly stated thus : functional continuity between 

 nerve-extremity and brain is proved to be neces- 

 sary for sensation, while on the other hand existence 

 of distinct routes of communication between them 

 is highly improbable ; and seeing that functional 

 continuity is sufficient of itself to explain the 

 phenomena, we are not entitled to assume the 



1 A wider generalization may probably be made, namely, that every 

 living element of texture exists in two conditions, the self-nutrient and 

 the irritated ; and only in proportion as self-nutrition is in abeyance is 

 the irritated condition possible. 



