CIVIL RIGHTS. 



131 



rights when denied or abridged by a State, but 

 not when invaded by individuals. As the act 

 of 1875 was intended to punish persons for 

 violating the civil rights of colored citizen.*, 

 when these rights were not denied by the 

 State, its enactment was held to be an exer- 

 cise of power not given to Congress by the 

 fourteenth amendment. The meaning of this 

 amendment and the reasons on which the 

 Court based its decision are set forth in the 

 following extracts from the opinion prepared 

 by Justice Bradley : 



The first section of the fourteenth amendment 

 (which is the one relied on), after declaring who shall 

 be citizens of the United States, and of the several 

 States, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory 

 upon the States. It declares that " no State shall 

 make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv- 

 ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ; 

 nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 

 or property without due process of law ; nor deny to 

 any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 

 of the laws." It is State action of a particular char- 

 acter that is prohibited. Individual invasion of indi- 

 vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the amend- 

 ment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies 

 and makes void all State legislation and State action 

 of every kind which impairs the privileges and im- 

 munities of citizens of the United States, or which in- 

 jures them in life, liberty, or property without due 

 process of law, or which denies to any of them the 

 equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, 

 but, in order that the national will, thus declared, 

 may not be a mere brutumfulmen, the last section of 

 the amendment invests Congress with power to en- 

 force it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what ? 

 To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate 

 legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited 

 State laws and State acts, and thus to render them 

 effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legis- 

 lative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the 

 whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power 

 to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain 

 of State legislation ; but to provide modes of relief 

 against State legislation, or State action, of the kind 

 referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create 

 a code of municipal law for the regulation of private 

 rights ; but to provide modes of redress against the 

 operation of State laws, and the action of State officers, 

 executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the 

 fundamental 'rights specified in the amendment. Posi- 

 tive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by 

 the fourteenth amendment ; but they are secured by 

 way of prohibition against State laws and State pro- 

 ceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by 

 power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of 

 carrying such prohibition inoo effect ; and such legis- 

 lation must necessarily be predicated upon such sup- 

 posed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed 

 to the correction of their operation and effect. A quite 

 full discussion of this aspect of the amendment may 

 be found in U. S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. Reports, 

 542 ; Virginia vs. Rives, 100 Id., 313, and Ex-parte 

 Virginia, 100 Id., 339. . . . 



Until some State law has been passed, or some State 

 action through its officers or agents has been taken, 

 adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protect- 

 ed by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the 

 United States under such amendment, nor any pro- 

 ceeding under such legislation, can be called into activ- 

 ity : for the prohibitions of the amendment are against 

 State laws and acts done under State authority. Of 

 course, legislation may, and should be, provided in 

 advance to meet the exigency when it arises ; but it 

 should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which 

 the amendment was intended to provide against : and 

 that is, State laws, or State action of some kind, ad- 



verse to the rights of the citizen secured by the amend- 

 ment. Such legislation can not properly cover the 

 whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty, 

 and property, defining them and providing for their ' 

 vindication. That would be to establish a code of mu- 

 nicipal law regulative of all private rights between 

 man and man in society. It would be to make Con- 

 gress take the place of the State Legislatures and to 

 supersede them. . . . 



An inspection of the law shows that it makes no 

 reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended 

 violation of the fourteenth amendment on the part of 

 the States. It is not predicated on any such view. It 

 proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts com- 

 mitted by individuals shall be deemed offenses, and 

 shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in 

 the courts of the United States. It does not profess 

 to be corrective of any constitutional wrong commit- 

 ted by the States; it does not make^ its operation to 

 depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies 

 equally to cases arising in States which have the just- 

 est laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and 

 whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, 

 as to those which arise in States that may have vio- 

 lated the prohibition of the amendment. In other 

 words, it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, 

 and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in 

 society toward each other, and imposes sanctions for 

 the enforcement of those rules, without referring in 

 any manner to any supposed action of the State or its 

 authorities. 



If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the 

 prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see 

 where it is to stop. Why may not Congress with 

 equal show of authority enact a code of laws for the 

 enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, lib- 

 erty, and property ? If it is supposable that the States 

 may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property with- 

 out due process of law (and the amendment itself does 

 suppose this)j why should not Congress proceed at 

 once to prescribe due process of law for the protection 

 of every one of these fundamental rights, in every pos- 

 sible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in 

 inns, public conveyances, and theatres ? . . . 



Civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Consti- 

 tution against State aggression, can not be impaired 

 by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by 

 State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judi- 

 cial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of 

 an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is 

 simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual ; t 

 an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is 

 true, whether they affect his person, his property, or 

 his reputation ; but if not sanctioned in some way by 

 the State, or not done under State authority, his rights 

 remain in full force, and may presumably be vindi- 

 cated by resort to the laws of the State for redress. . . . 



If the principles of interpretation which we have 

 laid down are correct, as we deem them to be (and 

 they are in accord with the principles laid down in 

 the cases before referred to, as well as in the recent 

 case of United States vs. Harris, decided at the last 

 term of this court), it is clear that the law in question 

 can not be sustained by any grant of legislative power 

 made to Congress by the fourteenth amendment. 

 That amendment prohibits the States from denying 

 to any person the equal protection of the laws,"and 

 declares that Congress shall have power to enforce, 

 by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the amend- 

 ment. The law in question, without any reference to . 

 adverse State legislation on the subject, declares that 

 all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations 

 and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and places 

 of public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon any 

 individual who shall deny to any citizen such equal 

 accommodations and privileges. This is not correct- 

 ive legislation ; it is primary and direct ; it takes im- 

 mediate and absolute possession of the subject of the 

 right of admission to inns, public conveyances, and 

 places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State 



