CONGRESS, UNITED STATES. (THE FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE.) 



237 



3. 28, 1882. It authorized the President to 

 nominate and, by and with the advice and con- 

 sent of the Senate, to appoint Fitz-John Porter, 

 late a major-general of the United States vol- 

 unteers and a brevet brigadier-general and colo- 

 nel of the army, to the position of colonel in 

 the army of the United States, of the same 

 grade and rank held by him at the time of his 

 dismissal from the army by sentence of court- 

 martial promulgated Jan. 27, 1863, and, in his 

 discretion, to place him on the retired-list of 

 the army as of that grade, the retired-list being 

 thereby increased in number to that extent. 

 It was reported by tbe majority of the Military 

 Committee and was in charge of Mr. Sewell, of 

 New Jersey. Mr. Logan, of Illinois, presented 

 a minority report in opposition to it. 



Mr. Sewell of course based his argument on 

 the finding of the advisory board appointed 

 April 12, 1878, by President Hayes, and con- 

 sisting of Maj.-Gen. J. M. Schofield, Brig.-Gen. 

 Alfred H. Terry, and Col. and brevet Maj.- 

 Gen. George W. Getty. He read many peti- 

 tions, opinions, and memorials, in favor of the 

 restoration of Fitz-John Porter, and cited the 

 conclusions of the advisory board as follows : 



These charges and specifications certainly bear no 

 discernible resemblance to the facts of the case as now 

 established. Yet it has been our duty to carefully 

 compare with these facts the views entertained by the 

 court-martial, as shown in the findings and in the re- 

 view of the case which was prepared for the informa- 

 tion of the President by the Judge-Advocate-Gencral, 

 who had conducted the prosecution, and thus to clear- 

 ly perceive every error into which the court-martial 

 was led. We trust it is not necessary for us to submit 

 in detail the results of this comparison, and that it will 

 be sufficient for us to point out the fundamental errors, 

 and, to sat/ that all the essential facts in evert/ instance 

 stand out in the clear and absolute contrast to those 

 supposed facts upon which Gen. Porter was adjudged 

 guuty. 



The fundamental errors upon which the conviction 

 of Gen. Porter depended may be summed up in few 

 words. It was maintained, and apparently established 

 to the satisfaction of the court- maitial, that only about 

 one half of the Confederate army was on the "field of 

 Manassas on the 29th of August, while Gen. Lee, with 

 the other half, was still beyond the Bull Run Mount- 

 ains; that Gen. Pope's army, exclusive of Porter's 

 corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal con- 

 test with the enemy, and only needed the aid of a 

 flank attack which Porter was expected to make to in- 

 sure the defeat and destruction or capture of the Con- 

 federate force in their front under Gen. Jackson ; that 

 McDowell and Porter, with their joint forces, Porter's 

 leading, had advanced toward Gainesville, until the 

 bead of their column had reached a point near the 

 Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of 

 Confederate troops, "seventeen regiments," which 

 Buford had counted as they passed through Gaines- 

 ville, marching along the road across Porter's front, 

 and going toward the field of battle at Groveton ; that 

 McDowell ordered Porter to at once attack that col- 

 umn thus moving to join Jackson, or the flank and rear 

 of the line if they had formed in line, while he would 

 take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and 

 throw them upon the enemy's center near Groveton ; 

 that Porter, McDowell having then separated from 

 him, disobeyed that order to attack, allowed that di- 

 vision of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, 

 and then fell back and retreated toward Manassas 

 Junction ; that Porter then remained in the rear all 

 me afternoon, listening to the sounds of battle and 



coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades 

 on the center and right of the field ; that this division 

 of the enemy having passed Porter's column and 

 formed on the right of Jackson's line, near Groveton, 

 an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or 

 rear of the enemy's line, upon which his own line of 

 march must bring him, but that he had willfully dis- 

 obeyed, and made no attempt to execute that order ; 

 that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy 

 Jackson's detached force before the other wing of 

 Gen. Lee's army could join it. and that this junction 

 having been effected during the night of the 29th, the 

 defeat of Gen. Pope's army on the 30th thus resulted 

 from Gen. Porter's neglect and disobedience. 



Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors the 

 following all-important facts are fully established : 



As Porter was advancing toward Gainesville, and 

 while yet nearly four miles from that place and more 

 than two miles from the nearest point of the Warren- 

 ton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confederate 

 army, 25,000 strong, which had arrived on the field 

 that morning and was already in line of battle. Not 

 being at that moment quite fully informed of the ene- 

 my's movements, and being then under orders from 

 Pope to push rapidly toward Gainesville, Porter was 

 pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, 

 when McDowell arrived on the field with later infor- 

 mation of the enemy, and later and very different or- 

 ders from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested 

 Porter's advance. This later information left no room 

 for doubt that the main body of Lee's army was al- 

 ready on the field and far in advance of Pope's army 

 in preparation for battle. Gen. McDowell promptly 

 decided not to attempt to go farther to the front, but 

 to deploy his column so as to form line in connection 

 with Gen. Pope's right wing, which was then engaged 

 with Jackson. To do this Gen. McDowell separated 

 his corps entirely from Gen. Porter's, and thus relin- 

 quished the command and all right to the command of 

 Porter's corps. McDowell did not give Porter any 

 order to attack, nor did he give him any order what- 

 ever to govern his action after their separation. 



It does not appear from the testimony that he con- 

 veyed to Gen. Porter in any way the erroneous view 

 of the military situation which was afterward main- 

 tained before court-martial, nor that he suggested to 

 Gen. Porter any expectation that he would make an 

 attack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the 

 witnesses as to what was actually said and done, the 

 information which McDowell and Porter then had re- 

 specting the enemy, and the movement which Mc- 

 Dowell decided to make, and did make, with his own 

 troops, prove conclusively that there was left no room 

 for aoubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to stand 

 on the defensive, and hold his position until McDow- 

 ell's movement could be completed. It would have 

 indicated a great error of military judgment to have 

 done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then 

 fully known to both McDowell and Porter. 



Gen. Pope appears, from his orders and from his 

 testimony, to have been at that time wholly ignorant 

 of the true situation. He had disapproved of the send- 

 ing of Kicketts to Thoroughfare Gap, to meet Long- 

 street on the 28th, believing that the main body of Lee's 

 army could not reach the field of Manassas before the 

 night of the 30th. Hence he sent the order to Porter, 

 dated 4.30P.M., to attack Jackson's right flar.k or 

 rear. Fortunately, that order did not reach Porter 

 until about sunset, too late for any attack to be made. 

 Any attack which Porter could have made at any time 

 that afternoon must necessarily have been fruitless of 

 any good result. 



Porter's faithful, subordinate, and intelligent con- 

 duct that 'afternoon saved the Union army from the 

 defeat which would otherwise have resulted that day 

 from the enemrfs more speedy concentration. The 

 only seriously critical period of that campaign name- 

 ly, between il A. M. and sunset of August 29th was 

 thus safely passed. Porter had understood and ap- 

 preciated the military situation, and, so far as he had 



