FRANCE. 



363 



BRANCH OF SERVICE. Men. 



Infantry 288,568 



Cavalry 68,722 



Artillery 70,379 



Engineers 11,007 



Train 11,696 



Six mixed companies in Tunis 2,834 



Administrative corps 28,573 



Gendarmerie 26,512 



Total active army 502,786 



There were organized 468 battalions of ac- 

 tive infantry, 435 battalions of territorial in- 

 fantry, and 3 63 battalions of fortress infantry, 

 depot troops, and other, infantry bodies, alto- 

 gether 1,266^ battalions, numbering 1,266,500 

 men ; 392 active squadrons, including 77 at the 

 depots, and 79 territorial squadrons of cavalry, 

 together 471 squadrons, containing 70,650 men ; 

 and 312 field-batteries, including 8 of marine, 

 57 of horse-artillery, 76 depot batteries, 57 

 batteries of fortress artillery, and 38 territorial 

 field-batteries, altogether 540 batteries, with 

 2,952 guns, numbering 180,000 men. Adding 

 45,000 engineers, 26,000 in the active and 19,- 

 000 in the territorial army, and 5,000 ponton- 

 niers, the total strength of the army on a war 

 footing is 1,567,150, and, including the auxiliary 

 services, 1,780,300 men, of which number 1,- 

 186,300 belong in the active and 594,000 in the 

 territorial army. 



The increase and enlargement of the for- 

 tresses, notably the innumerable blockade for- 

 tresses erected on the German frontier, neces- 

 sitate an augmentation of the artillery. A 

 law passed in the session of 1883 raises the 

 peace footing of this arm 8,840 men, and pro- 

 vides for the increase of the batteries of sta- 

 tionary artillery ready for mobilization from 

 57 to 190. The complete separation of the 

 field and fortress artillery, accomplished in the 

 German army, is not carried out. The two 

 branches of the arm are, however, divided into 

 separate battalions. The cost of the augmenta- 

 tion was partly met by abolishing the active 

 artillery train. The difference is scarcely felt 

 in an army budget for 1883 of 584.000,000 

 francs, and supplementary estimates of 81,000,- 

 000 francs. The willingness of the French peo- 

 ple to endure sacrifices for the re-establishment 

 of their military power is shown by the calmly 

 received statement of Minister Billot that the 

 replacement of war material since the war had 

 cost 2,289,000,000 francs, and would require 

 300,000,000 more. 



The Navy. The navy, at the beginning of 

 1882, had 57 iron-clad steamers, with 481 

 guns ; 264 unarmored screw-steamers, with 

 1,547 guns ; 62 side- wheel steamers, with 154 

 guns; and 113 sailing-vessels, with 672 guns; 

 altogether 496 vessels, with 2,854 guns. The 

 ironclads of the first class were 26 in number; 

 of the second class, 18 ; coast-guards, 6 ; float- 

 ing batteries, 7. The most powerful of the iron- 

 clads are the Devastation, Foudroyant, and 

 Admiral Duperre, all constructed on the same 

 model, mainly of steel, 312 feet long, the first 

 two with 14-inch armor, and carrying four 38- 



ton and two 25-ton guns, the last armored with 

 12 inches of steel, and without the two smaller 

 guns. Next to these come 6 battle-ships, dif- 

 fering only in size and strength, armed with 

 two 38-ton guns, and two of them carrying 

 four 24-ton guns. All have horizontal steel 

 plates, bomb-proof decks, and their guns mount- 

 ed en barbette. There were five more not 

 much inferior, and differing in little except in 

 having smaller guns and lighter armor. The 

 rest of the ironclads were of antiquated de- 

 signs. There were building in 1882 the Kai- 

 man, the Terrible, and the Requin, on the 

 model of the Inflexible, but smaller, with fixed 

 turrets and guns mounted en barbette, plated 

 with compound armor, 50 centimetres thick, 

 each of 7,168 tons' displacement; also three 

 ships of the Audacious class, with plates of 25 

 centimetres' thickness, and the Formidable and 

 Amiral Vaubin, monster ironclads of 11,300 

 tons, with armor 45 to 55 centimetres thick. 



Finance. The accounts of 1 870 and 1871 were 

 balanced with a surplus of 113,730,053 francs. 

 The accounts of 1872, 1873, and 1874 were 

 closed with deficits amounting to the sum of 

 191,264,128 francs. The budget of 1875 shows 

 98,204,823 francs excess of receipts ; that of 

 1876, 98,204,823 francs; that of 1877, 63,811,- 

 309 francs; that of 1878, 62,356,879 francs; 

 that of 1879, 96,207,185 francs ; that of 1880, 

 134,450,970 francs; that of 1881, 70,793,882 

 francs. The budget of 1882 presents a deficit 

 of 47,397,195 francs. The estimates for 1883, 

 after the presentation of an extraordinary 

 budget of 800,000, OOO'francs, showed an excess 

 of expenditures incurred by the Government 

 over the credits voted, amounting to 100,000,- 

 000 francs. It was stated in the debates that 

 the expenditures on war material and fortifica- 

 tions since the war had amounted to 2 mil- 

 liards, and those on public works to If mil- 

 liards. The total expenditures, according to 

 the closed accounts for 1869, amounted in that, 

 the last normal year under the empire, to 

 1,740,000,000 francs. The greatly increased 

 and still increasing expenditures under the re- 

 public, due mainly to the greatly augmented 

 public debt, but to a considerable extent to in- 

 creased expenditures on the army, and for va- 

 rious other objects, were partly covered by 

 the increased yield of the direct taxes, yet 

 chiefly by the imposition of new indirect 

 taxes, such as sugar, wine, salt, and railroad 

 imposts. 



The practice of presenting nearly balanced 

 budgets, and in the final accounts, published a 

 number of years afterward, disclosing large 

 deficits, did not originate with the ministers of 

 the republic, but has been followed by all the 

 governments of France since- the Restoration. 

 The public debt of France before the German 

 War was largely the result of this process. 



The state of the public finances has given 

 rise to serious alarm for several years past. 

 The prudent and economical financial manage- 

 ment of M. Thiers and the other statesmen 



