GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION, THE. 



423 



Mnd the Proteus, Lieut. Garlington's relief party 

 would have remained at that point, with ample sup- 

 plies, keeping " their telescopes on Cape Sabine and 

 the land to the northward," and waiting for Lieut. 



now the case, if he has successfully obeyed his orders, 

 neither house nor provisions, but only the record of 

 the complete failure of the mission of the Proteus and 

 the Yantic. . . . Your attention is also called to an- 

 other point. You had been furnished with copies of 

 the instructions to Lieut. Garlington and were aware 

 that he was ordered, in the event of the failure of the 

 Proteus, to reach Lady Franklin bay, to establish the 

 relief station at Littleton island, and that Lieut. Greely 

 would endeavor to reach that point in September, ex- 

 pecting there to find a relief party, a house, food, and 

 provisions. You were at Littleton island on August 

 3d, and learned that the Proteus had been crushed, and 

 that Lieut. Garliiigton and his whole party had gone 

 south, leaving nothing for Greely at Littleton island. 

 You could have readily landed there provisions and 

 supplies, but omitted to dp so. You will please ex- 

 plain this omission, and will furnish the department 

 a schedule in detail of the provisions of all kinds 

 which you then had on board the Yantic, and a simi- 

 lar schedule of those you had on hand when you ar- 

 rived at St. John's on September 13th. In the instruc- 

 tions of the War Department to Lieut. Garlington, 

 dated June 4, 1883, is the following clause : " A ship 

 of the United States Navy, the Yantic, will accom- 

 pany you as far as Littleton island, rendering you 

 such aid as may become necessary and as may be de- 

 termined by tne captain of that ship and yourself 

 when on the spot." You will inform the department 

 whether or not you had knowledge of this clause. In- 

 closed you will also find a copy of a memorandum 

 marked " Inclosure 4," containing instructions for the 

 guidance of the naval tender and the Proteus, and you 

 will inform the department whether r during your voy- 

 age, these or any such instructions were seen by you, 

 or were only communicated to you. 



In his reply, dated Oct. 16th, Commander 

 Wildes explained that the Yantic was forced, 

 on account of the condition of her boilers, to 

 go from St. John's to Greenland under sail, and 

 to take an easterly course to avoid the ice of 

 the Labrador coast, while the Proteus steamed 

 directly for Godhaven. He said: 



No time was lost, and no unnecessary delay was 

 made at any point. The Proteus, carrying a' large 

 supply of coal, and steaming at full speed, had only 

 to delay to obtain the Stores left at Godhaven last 

 year, and a native dog-driver from Disco Fiord. She 

 then went north without stopping. Had I sailed from 

 Godhaven at the same time as the Proteus, besides be- 

 ing unable to keep up with her, I should have arrived 

 at Littleton island, 1.000 mues distant, with my coal- 

 supply reduced to about 75 tons and the boilers in a 

 leaky, precarious condition. This is without taking 

 into account any detention from thick weather or ice, 

 which can not be counted on, as the normal condition 

 of this region appears to be fog. 



After explaining the dangers and difficulties 

 of Melville bay, he added : 



In view of these facts I should have felt justified in 

 delaying to a still later date the attempt to cross Mel- 

 ville bay, or even not making the attempt at all. But 

 I did not delay one moment after I considered my ship 

 prepared and the weather had cleared, but pushed 

 across to Cape York ? feeling certain from the thick, fog- 

 gy weather, raw, chilly air, flumes of snow and smooth 

 sea, that the middle pack was not far distant. Pan- 

 dora harbor was reached six days after the boats had 

 gone south. To conclude this part, I did not intend 

 to run the vessel under my command in the hap-haz- 



ard, happy-go-lucky fashion which finally brought the 

 Proteus to grief, but to make sure, so far as possible, 

 of every step which I took. Had the Proteus been 

 ordered to keep company with the Yantic, it would 

 have been vastly better for all concerned. 



Regarding the so-called supplemental in- 

 struction, spoken of as u Inclosure No. 4," Com- 

 mander Wildes declared that he never heard 

 of it until his arrival at St. John's on the return 

 trip. In conclusion, he expressed his willing- 

 ness to shoulder all the responsibility that be- 

 longed to him, and asked, in case there was 

 any doubt that he had performed his full duty, 

 that a court of inquiry be ordered to investi- 

 gate his conduct. 



Lieut. Garlington's report not being wholly 

 satisfactory to the Signal-Service Bureau and 

 the War Department, a series of questions 

 were addressed to him, replies to which were 

 received on the 24th of October. In these he 

 explained more fully why he failed to establish 

 a depot of supplies at Littleton island and to 

 remain in that region for the arrival of the 

 Yantic, which he was convinced would not be 

 able to make her way through the ice-pack of 

 Melville bay. He also explained why he was 

 obliged to leave a portion of the supplies of 

 the Proteus on the ice-floe, and was unable to 

 leave any boats for the use of Lieut. Greely. 

 In answer to the question why he did not re- 

 main north of Cape York with his party, he 

 said: 



I did not remain at Cape York because I did not 

 sec then, nor do I see now, how I could possibly have 

 been of any service to Lieut. Greely. ^ From the best 

 information attainable I an* of the opinion that there 

 are no more than 125 Esquimaux from Cape York to 

 Eensselaer bay, and it is a well-known fact that they 

 are a very improvident and shiftless race, and on the 

 verge of starvation every winter. To have quartered 

 a party, however small, without provisions, on these 

 people, with the chance of Lieut. Greely reaching there 

 with his party during the fall, would have been but to 

 seriously endanger the lives of the whole community, 

 without being able to accomplish any good whatever. 

 I had not more than two weeks' supplies when I left 

 Cape York. I left that point for the same reason I 

 left Cape Sabine to endeavor to help Lieut. Greely 

 in the only way it seemed to me practicable. 



In conclusion, he also asked for a court of 

 inquiry if his explanation of his conduct was 

 not satisfactory. 



After these explanations had been made, the 

 Secretary of War addressed a letter to the 

 Chief Signal-Officer, in which he sharply criti- 

 cised the entire management of the relief ex- 

 pedition. He thought that two serious omis- 

 sions had been made which contributed to its 

 failure. In the first place, Lieut. Garlington 

 should have established a base of supplies at 

 Littleton island on his way northward, and in 

 this connection the Secretary made some point- 

 ed references to the careless manner in which 

 the memorandum known as u Inclosure No. 4 " 

 had been dealt with. It had been inclosed in 

 the instructions without clearly being made 

 part of them. The other important omission 

 was the failure of the Proteus and the Yantic 

 to keep together, which had not been satisiac- 





