LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



471 



as language used in a compact of two nations 

 "for the adjustment of the claims of the citi- 

 zens of either against the other," and entered 

 into to " increase the friendly feeling existing 

 between the republics." 



No nation treats with a citizen of another nation 

 except through his government. The treaty, when 

 made, represents a compact between the governments, 

 and each government holds the other responsible for 

 everything done by their respective citizens under it. 

 The citizens of the United States having claims 

 against Mexico were not parties to this convention. 

 They induced the United States to assume the re- 

 sponsibility of seeking redress for injuries they claimed 

 to have sustained by the conduct of Mexico, and as a 

 means of obtaining such redress the convention was 

 entered into, by which not only claims of citizens of 

 the United States against Mexico were to be adjusted 

 and paid, but those of citizens of Mexico against the 

 United States as well. By the terms of the compact 

 the individual claimants could not themselves submit 

 their claims and proofs to the commission to be passed 

 upon. Only such claims as were presented to the 

 Governments respectively could be "referred" to the 

 commission, and the commissioners were not allowed 

 to investigate or decide on any evidence or informa- 

 tion except such as was furnished by or on behalf of 

 the Governments. While the claims of the individual 

 citizens were to be considered by the commission in 

 determining amounts, the whole purpose of the con- 

 vention was to ascertain how much was due from 

 one Government to the other on account of the de- 

 mands of their respective citizens. As between the 

 United States and Mexico the awards are final and 

 conclusive until set aside by agreement between the 

 two Governments or otherwise. Mexico can not, un- 

 der the terms of the treaty, refuse to make the pay- 

 ments at the times agreed on if required by the United 

 States. This she does not now seek to do. Her pay- 

 ments have all been made promptly as they fell due, 

 as far as these records show. What she asks is the 

 consent of the United States to her release from lia- 

 bility under the convention on account of the particu- 

 lar awards now hi dispute, because of the alleged 

 fraudulent character of the proof in support of the 

 claims which the United States were induced by the 

 claimants to furnish for the consideration of the com- 

 mission. 



Chief-Justice Waite, who wrote the opinion, 

 proceeded as follows : 



As to the right of the United States to treat with 

 Mexico for a retrial, we entertain no doubt. Each 

 Government, when it entered into the compact under 

 which the awards were made, relied on the nonor and 

 good faith of the other for protection as far as possi- 

 ble against frauds and impositions by the individual 

 claimants. It was for this reason that all claims were 

 excluded from the consideration of the commission 

 except such as should be referred by the several gov- 

 ernments, and no evidence in support of or against a 

 claim was to be submitted except through or by the 

 Governments. The presentation by a citizen of a 

 fraudulent claim or false testimony for reference to the 

 commission was an imposition on his own Government, 

 and if that Government afterward discovered that it 

 had in this way been made an instrument of wrong 

 toward a friendly power, it would be not only its 

 right, but its duty, to repudiate the act and make rep- 

 aration as far as possible for the consequences of its 

 neglect if any there had been. International arbitra- 

 tion must always proceed on the highest principles of 

 national honor and integrity. No technical rules of 

 pleading as applied in municipal courts ought ever to 

 be allowed to stand in the way of the national power 

 to do what is right under all the circumstances. The 

 cases cited by counsel all relate to the disposition to be 

 made of the proceeds of international awards after 

 they have passed beyond the reach of the Govern- 



ments and into the hands of private parties. The lan- 

 guage of the opinions must be construed in connec- 

 tion with this fact. 



The first section of the act of 1878, said the 

 Chief -Justice, authorizes and requires the Sec- 

 retary of State to receive the moneys paid by 

 Mexico under the convention, and to distribute 

 them among the several claimants, but it mani- 

 fests no disposition on the part of Congress to 

 encroach on the power of the President and 

 Senate to conclude another treaty with Mex- 

 ico, with respect to any or even all the claims 

 allowed by the commission, if in their opinion 

 the honor of the United States demand it. At 

 most, it only provides for receiving and dis- 

 tributing the sums paid without a protest or 

 reservation, such as, in the opinion of the 

 President, is entitled to further consideration. 

 It does not undertake to set any new limits on 

 the powers of the Executive. By the fifth sec- 

 tion of that act the President is expressly au- 

 thorized to refuse payment, and to negotiate a 

 new treaty if he deemed it expedient. It is 

 clearly within his discretion to withhold all 

 further payments until the diplomatic negotia- 

 tions between the two governments are con- 

 cluded. "The United States, when they as- 

 sumed the responsibility of presenting the 

 claims of their citizens to Mexico for payment, 

 entered into no contract obligations w.ith the 

 claimants to assume their frauds and to col- 

 lect on their account all that, by their imposi- 

 tion of false testimony, might be given in the 

 awards of the commission. As between the 

 United States and the, claimants, the honesty 

 of the claims is always open to inquiry for the 

 purposes of fair dealing with the government 

 against which, through the United States, a 

 claim has been made." 



Legal-Tender lets. On March 3, 1884, the 

 United States Supreme Court rendered an 

 opinion sustaining the validity of the legal-ten- 

 der acts passed by Congress both during and 

 since the war. It holds that Congress has the 

 constitutional power to make United States 

 notes a legal tender in payment of private 

 debts, either in time of war or in time of 

 peace. 



This is the third time that the court has de- 

 cided this question within fourteen years. It 

 was first called upon to consider the constitu- 

 tionality of tbe legal-tender legislation of Con- 

 gress in the case of Hepburn against Griswold, 

 decided during the session of 1869-"TO, and re- 

 ported in vol. viii of "Wallace's Keports. The 

 court then decided that the acts of 1862 and 

 1863, making United States notes a legal ten- 

 der in payment of all debts public and private, 

 were unconstitutional so far as they applied to 

 debts contracted before the .passage of those 

 acts. The question as to pre-existing debts 

 was the only one raised by the case, and the 

 only one expressly decided. The reasoning of 

 the court, however, went to the extent that 

 Congress had no constitutional power to make 

 United States notes a legal tender, either for 



