The Evolution of Mind. 193 



Nothing is or can be known except resemblances and differ- 

 ences. They constitute the totality of knowledge in savan, 

 savage, child, beast and insect, so far as can be discovered.* 

 As the numbers, forms and arrangements of the molecules 

 make all the differences between crystals, so the numbers, 

 forms and arrangements of like and unlike experiences 

 seem to make the differences between minds. These are 

 all successively grouped in a way that causes psychic and 

 physical relations to reach toward perfect correspondence. f 

 All the separate facts in each individual fuse into a common 

 whole, constituting the ego as it exists at any moment. 

 That the substance of such facts is the brain-structure, 

 there can be little cause for doubt ; and that they are evoked 

 as required, by streams of nerve-energy, appears to be 

 equally clear. It therefore seems strange that immediate 

 acts of consciousness are limited in the manner we find 

 them to be. The whole brain no doubt takes part in 

 thought, as the whole body does in feeling ; but it is evi- 

 dently in a mediate rather than an immediate manner. Its 

 separate impressions somewhere fuse into the one persist- 

 ent feeling of self. While the energy evoking the stream 

 of consciousness flows from the whole brain (and indeed 

 from the whole nervous system), the substance that is thus 

 made conscious is some highly differentiated section of that 

 organ. Viewed in this manner, a reconciliation is observed 

 between the modern doctrine of reflex action of Carpenter, 

 Maudsley, etc.,t and Lewes' belief § that the spinal cord is 

 also conscious. It is quite certain that in spinal reflexes 

 and in unconscious cerebration we take no part that we are 

 aware of. It seems clearly proven that such acts display 

 the signs we are accustomed to interpret as meaning motion, 

 will, feeling, teachability, etc. 



As recent researches seem to show consciousness among 

 monocellular creatures, it would seem to be a fair inference 

 to believe that polycellular ones by differentiation from 

 these should have many centers with distinct autonomies. 

 Lewes makes the whole nervous system a single sensor him 

 commune. || Maudsley makes the cerebrum the sole center 

 of sensation. IT If we agree with the latter regarding the 



* Ribot's English Psychology, p. 175. 



t Ribot's English Psychology, p. 189. 



% Maudsley'S Physiology of Mind, pp. 13G-182. 



§ Lewes' Physical Basis of Mind, pp. 509-549. || Ibid, p. 55G, § 94. 



II Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, pp. 244, 245. 



