Evolution of Theology. 237 



to an indwelling human personality endowed with powers 

 and activities similar to his own, capable of producing like 

 effects, but by supra-natural forces. He does not recognize 

 plant-spirits or animal-spirits as distinct in their form or 

 mode of operation, i. e., as possessing respectively the form 

 of plant, animal, etc. There is, in each case, the idea of a 

 being, behind the appearances and effects, exhibiting itself 

 as power in action, and controlled by a personal will. 



Recently, however, there has been much discussion of the 

 question whether this ascription by early man of personal 

 powers to natural objects is, in the first instance, directly 

 made by him, and an immediate result of the impact of 

 mind upon surrounding phenomena ; or whether it is a sec- 

 ondary development, and reached through a prior experience. 



The former theory, known generally as the animistic, had 

 been held quite universally until the publication of Mr. 

 Spencer's views on ghost and ancestor worship, which, as 

 seeking to find therein the origin of all theistic and relig- 

 ious conceptions, is, in its general outline and scope, at 

 variance with the animistic view. Personification of natu- 

 ral objects is not, he claims, first in order in the history of 

 theistic ideas. These latter are primarily otherwise derived. 

 Primitive man does not conceive of Mind as distinct from 

 Body. Whatever experiences befall him he does not place 

 to the account of either, to the exclusion of the other. In 

 sleep and dreams he engages in battle and the chase, pre- 

 pares and partakes of food, exults in victory, and fears 

 approaching danger. Waking, he recalls these vivid expe- 

 riences, but wakes to find himself lying in the same place 

 where he betook himself to rest. We say that these are 

 merely fancies ; the mind has been sporting with illusions, 

 while the body has been quiescent. Our true self has been 

 oblivious to these. Not so, however, does he say. His 

 inevitable conclusion is that some other self than his waking 

 self has, for the while, left the body, taken to itself some 

 other body, — has been journeying, warring, hunting, and, 

 at the moment of return to ordinary consciousness, has 

 resumed its occupation of the body-proper. These visions 

 and experiences are not to him unreal. They are as* real as 

 the familiar objects and pursuits of his waking hours. He 

 truly saw his friend or foe. He entertains no question that 

 his other-self experiences are as genuine as those which 

 affect him in ordinary life. This idea of a duplicate-self, 



