The Philosophy of Evolution. 351 



well pause before entering the lists against Mr. Spencer, 

 jet one is also daunted at finding himself planted on a 

 metaphysical bog for the foundation of a physical philoso- 

 phy, and therefore he may make a shift to get foothold else- 

 where. 



And perhaps he may find such foothold in the position 

 that the units of feeling seen in consciousness are really only 

 units of force (which are recognized as the ultimate elements 

 of the external world), seen under a subjective transfor- 

 mation effected by nerve-sensibility. In confirmation of 

 this he may at least point out that knowledge, so long as it 

 was discussed as composed of units of feeling, was sterile 

 of results and incapable of progress. Only when it began 

 to be viewed as composed of units of force did it become 

 useful and open to an endless development. As an example 

 of this we may cite the futile and unprogressive study of 

 the nature of mind when conducted by the method of in- 

 trospection, or looking at one's feelings, after the manner 

 of philosophers preceding the last half century. Much 

 was said and written by them, all to small purpose. Mind 

 was as little disclosed as matter, and of neither was there 

 much real knowledge. Introspection merely kept turning 

 round and round in its own bushel-basket at home. But 

 no sooner did mind begin to be studied as itself a form of 

 matter, as an external object and a part of physiology, 

 than light began to appear and knowledge to advance. Sig- 

 nificant is it also, in this connection, that Mr. Spencer's 

 luminous exposition of the composition of mind borrows its 

 lucidity from the author's constant recurrence to the phe- 

 nomena of matter and material action. It might indeed be 

 called an exposition of mind considered as included in the 

 forces of material nature. In other words, though he in- 

 sists upon mind as being ultimately composed of units of 

 feeling, he expounds it as if it were composed of units of 

 force. 



And this is in fact the method to which all men of science 

 are driven at last. Though consciousness gives only feel- 

 ing as its experience, and perception as the result of feel- 

 ing, and though this be asserted to be the internal and 

 primary testimony of consciousness, yet no sooner is this 

 proposition laid down than the barrenness of it begins to 

 be felt, and the faithful internal psychologist is immediately 

 hurried forth to say that these units of feeling appear also 



