24 
whether the reflex function of Dr. Mar- 
shall Hall, on which respiration, degluti- 
tion, the evacuation of the bowels and blad- 
der, &c. depend, is to be regarded as the re- 
sult of a merely physical impression on the 
nerves and spinal cord, like the impression of 
blood on the heart; or whether the sensations 
which naturally accompany these actions are, 
in the natural state, of the cause which 
excites them. But that even when the volun- 
wers of animals are certainly the means 
employed for the ends of their creation, they 
are still very generally guided by the superior 
intelligence which has framed both theirphy- 
sical and mental constitution, and which rules 
the mental but instinctive efforts consequent 
on the sensations that are felt, as surely as the 
laws of muscular contraction rule the move- 
ments of the heart; and it is into the hands of 
man alone that the reins of voluntary power 
are absolutely resigned. 
And when we thus pass in review the sen- 
sorial and voluntary powers of animals, we 
are naturally led to the question, whether there 
is really in our Own case so great an exception 
to those laws of nature which regulate all the 
other members of the animal creation; whe- 
ther, admitting the essential superiority of the 
intellect or reason of man, the different desires 
and motives to action, which are implanted in 
him, are not equally subject to the control of 
the power that gives them, and whether their 
consequences are not as exactly ruled by laws 
and as fully anticipated, as those of the in- 
stincts of animals. 
Without entering fully on this abstruse ques- 
tion, we would take the liberty of remarking, 
in the view of placing it in its simplest form 
before our readers, that as the intimations of 
our own consciousness are the ultimate foun- 
dation of all the knowledge that we have or 
ean have of our own minds, and as certain of 
the intuitive principles of belief which our 
minds naturally suggest to us must be trusted, 
if we are to inquire into the subject at all ; 
so the only question that can be reasonably 
proposed on this point is, whether there is any - 
good reason for suspecting that the belief of 
our own free-will, which naturally attends cer- 
tain of the operations of our minds, is a de- 
ception; and that the analogy of other ani- 
mals is only applicable to the subject in so 
far as it can throw light on that question. 
Now, we find that the works of man, which 
we ascribe to his reason, and in the execution 
of which the consciousness of his free-will 
intervenes, are essentially different from those 
which we ascribe to the blind instincts of ani- 
mals, in the total absence (already noticed) of 
that uniformity which is so leading a charac- 
teristic of the effects of the latter; and we may 
reasonably assert that this is just the difference 
to be expected between the works of man and 
of other animals, on the supposition that the 
power concerned in the former is not subject 
to the direct influence and control of that 
higher intellect, by which the Jaws and limits 
of that concerned in the latter are irrevocably 
set; and therefore, that there exists no such 
INSTINCT. 
analogy between the works of man and of other 
animals as need induce us to suspect, that thi 
evidence of his consciousness on the point it 
question is not to be trusted. “ 
At the same time it ought to be observer 
and perhaps has not been duly remarked, ne 
only that the desires which are the principé 
motives to human action, are analogous to 
sometimes identical with, the instincts of ar 
mals, (many of them having been eviden 
given him with the same intention, and ith 3 
clear perception of their general result on fi 
condition,)—but also that the constitution 
the human mind appears from the intimation 
of our own consciousness to be such, as to 
allow of interposition of a superior power 
controlling in a certain degree the will ¢ 
without making itself obvious to his min 
For it is admitted by the soundest metaphy 
sicians, that the only truly voluntary po 
which we are conscious of ing over t 
train of thought in our minds, and therefore 
ultimately over many of our actions, operate 
only indirectly.* We have no power of de 
termining the thoughts that succeed one an 
ther or regulating the order of their succes 
sion ; and although various laws of association 
have been laid down, by which many of the 
component parts of the train appear to be con- 
nected, yet it will hardly appear to any om 
who reflects on the operations of his mind, 
that a// the thoughts which succeed one ano- 
ther can be ascertained to have such bonds o 
connection with one another. At all events, 
the only strictly voluntary power which we 
are conscious that we possess, is that of singlin; 
out and detaining any particular portion of the 
train, whereby it may be made to predominate 
in the mind, and to produce practical results 
which might not otherwise have followed; and 
even this kind of influence over the train of 
thought is not exercised exclusively by volition, 
but is produced in a great measure also by 
other causes, physical and moral. Nowif this” 
be so, how can we deny the possibility of a 
superior intelligence retaining a power of con- 
trolling the acts of any individual human mind, 
or of any number of minds, either by suggest- 
ing particular thoughts, or by causing the mind 
to dwell upon particular thoughts in preference 
to others, without its sense of its own volun- 
tary power being interrupted or withdrawn,—= 
nay, without the spontaneous voluntary power 
being really suspended, the only difference 
being in the degree of influence which it exerts 
over the train of thought and consequent 
litions ? nak. 
It has been said that the expression in Pope’s 
Universal Prayer— Raat 
az 
* «« So completely is the current of th in 
the mind,” says Stewart, ‘‘ subjected to physical 
laws, that it has been justly by Lor 
Kames that we cannot, by an effort of our will, 
call up any one thought, and that the train of our 
ideas depends on causes which operate in a man- 
ner inexplicable by us, ‘This observation, although 
it has been censured as paradoxical, is almost self- 
evident ; for to call up any particular thought sup- 
poses it to be already in the mind.” — Elements, 
ch, v. sect, 3. af 
