28 
powers, and its instinctive propensities. Ei- 
ther directly or indirectly a Mind, and that 
not the mind of any living animal, must rule, 
according to general laws, the instinctive ac- 
tions of all. 
It is true that there have been, in all ages, 
some resolute sceptics, who do not assent to 
the proposition that design can be traced from 
its effects, or that the observed adaptation of 
means to ends authorizes us to infer the exist- 
ence of an intelligent agent; but such a sceptic, 
if he be consistent, must also refuse his assent 
to the evidence of the existence of any sentient 
or intelligent being but himself. “ How do I 
know,” says Dr. Reid, “ that any man of my 
aeeeance has understanding? I never saw his 
understanding. I see only certain effects, which 
my judgment leads me to conclude to be marks 
and tokens of it. But, says a sceptical philo- 
sopher, you can conclude nothing from these, 
unless past experience has informed you that 
such tokens are always joined with understand- 
ing. Alas, it is impossible I can have this ex- 
rience. The understanding of another man 
is no immediate object of sight, nor of any 
other faculty which God has given me; and 
unless I can conclude its existence from tokens 
that are visible, I can have no evidence that 
there is understanding in any man.” 
In fact, the sceptical reasoner who refuses 
his assent to the intuitive judgment by which 
we infer design from its effects, can only be 
truly and thoroughly consistent if he place no 
faith in any intuitive truth, or first principle of 
belief, and therefore disbelieves the suggestions 
of his own consciousness. ‘ To such a scep- 
tic,” says Dr. Reid, “ I have nothing to say ; 
but of the semi-sceptics, I should beg to know, 
why they believe in the existence of their own 
impressions and ideas. The true reason I be- 
lieve to be, because’ they cannot help it; and 
the same reason will make them believe many 
other things.” * 
2. The evidence of design, which we deduce 
from the instinctive actions of man himself, has 
this striking peculiarity, that we are actually 
conscious of the propensities which excite them, 
and at the same time know that the purpose or 
design of these actions is not of our own con- 
trivance. We may be said actually to feed the 
adaptation, designed by Nature, not by our- 
selves, of the constitution of our minds to the 
laws of external nature and to the wants of our 
bodily organization. The very same machinery, 
consisting of efforts of volition, of actions pro- 
pagated along nerves, and of contractions of 
muscles, which we put in motion to accom- 
lish any of those objects which our own intel- 
igence and foresight enable us to understand, we 
here put in motion in obedience to propensi- 
ties implanted in us by nature, with as little 
knowledge of the purpose which it is to serve, 
and in the first instance with as little knowledge 
of the pleasure it is to procure, as the heart 
that beats within us has of the nature and uses 
of the circulation which it supports. In the 
performance of every one of these actions, we 
* Essays on Intellectua) Powers, p. 621 et seq. 
INSTINCT. 
may truly say that the intelligent mind of man 
bows to the superior wisdom of the Author o 
Nature. ’ s 
The speculations of Darwin on this subjee 
seem intended to weaken the evidence as to tl 
divine existence and attributes drawn from thi 
phenomena of instinct, first, by prey 
explain the instinctive movements : 
animals on the principle of irregular mov 
ments being first produced by uneasy a 
tions, and then those motions being selectet 
and voluntarily performed, which are found b 
experience to appease these sensations or pro- 
cure pleasure ; and secondly, by referring to 
fact formerly stated, that most instinctive pro- 
pensities are linked to, and, as he ‘it, 
* under the conduct of sensations pe desires * 
(as 
The first of these assertions is quite inconsi 
with what has been observed by others 
already remarked) in regard to the commenc 
ment of the instinctive actions in young ani. 
mals.* As tothe second, it is quite plain that the 
inference, which is drawn from the observed 
adaptation of means to ends in the phenome 
of instinct, does not require that there shall be r 
mental antecedent exciting the instinctive pro~ 
pensity, but only that the mental antecedent 
shall not be an anticipation, grounded on 
soning, of the effect which the action will pro- 
duce. ‘Even if the immediate antecedent of 
every instinctive effort were a pleasing ser 
tion, it would still be a fact, in the constitution 
of animals, that certain of their sensations, and 
not others, are naturally followed by certain 
definite muscular contractions, varying in the 
different tribes, and each adapted to a determi- 
nate end, known neither by experience nor by 
the reason of the aniinal exhibiting it; and this 
is the fact which justifies the conclusion in 
question. This has been already explained, 
and is so fully illustrated by Mr. Stewart in the 
answer, contained in his Life of Dr. Reid, to’ 
the criticisms of Darwin, that it is unnecessary 
to dwell upon it. ?* 
But although it is clearly no objection to the — 
evidence of design and benevolence in the Au-— 
thor of Nature, drawn from the phenomena of 
instinct, that the instinctive propensities are- 
often linked to and excited by certain pleasur- 
able sensations, yet it is a strong indication of 
the superior power by which they are implanted 
in the different orders of animals, that when 
they are in full force, and the object to be 
accomplished by them is important, they have 
frequently power to supersede and subvert the 
motives, by which the ordinary actions of the 
same animals are regulated, and suspend the 
ordinary laws of their mental constitution, so — 
as to induce an animal to persevere in actions” 
attended with privation and fatigue and positive 
suffering. “It ought not to be forgotten,” sa 
Paley, “ how much the instinct often costs the — 
animal that feels it; how much (e.g.) a bird — 
gives up by sitting on her nest,—how repug- 
nant it is to her organization, her habits, and 
her pleasures. An animal formed for liberty 
* See Kirby and Spence, Introd. to Entomology, 
vol. ii, p. 468. 
7 
