___ tween the constitution of the mind of man and 
of that of the dumb animals. 
_. But it has nevertheless been long observed, 
_ that while animals are thus incapable of com- 
peepee the importance or devising means 
__ for the attainment of objects which we perceive 
to be within their reach, and clearly and imme- 
diately important to them, they habitually per- 
i form many actions which are admirably adapted 
_ to the attainment of certain ends, and these 
_ often remote and obscure, and known to us 
_ only by means of repeated observation and re- 
_ flection, and strictly inductive reasoning. No 
_ animals, for example, are capable of such ob- 
Servation and comprehension of the laws of 
_ fature, as to procure for themselves at pleasure 
artificial heat or regular and uniform supplies 
_ Of food; but many are seen to form nests or 
burrows, and lay up magazines of provisions, 
early in the autumn, which are to protect them 
+ omg cold and famine during the winter ; 
ow ile others, even while the temperature is still 
mild, undertake long and painful aerial voy- 
_ ages, whereby they escape from the rigours of 
‘a northern climate, and enjoy the warmth and 
abundance of the tropical regions. Such pro- 
olga for future contingencies are within the 
_ power of man, but in him they are clearly de- 
pendent on the power of forming and applying 
_ general notions ; and if the lower animals pos- 
_ Sessed that power, we can see nothing to hinder 
their enjoying the use of language, and might 
_ confidently expect to see many indications of 
varied contrivance for their own immediate 
convenience, which never present themselves 
sence of intelligence in the other actions of 
inimals, corresponding to that which ap- 
bears manifestly to regulate certain actions 
_ which accomplish certain definite purposes, is 
_ Our first reason for believing that, while nature 
-vouchsafed to man alone the enjoyment of 
vhat we call Reason,—the power of compre- 
ding her laws, and so adapting means to 
nds as to turn these laws to his own advan- 
age,—she has provided for the maintenance 
Mf other animals, not only by the circumstances 
m which she has placed them in the world, but 
0 by imparting to them, on certain occasions, 
peculiar mental impulse, urging them to the 
formance of certain actions which are useful 
D themselves or to their kind, but the use of 
hich they do not themselves perceive, and 
t performance of which is a necessary con- 
ence of their being placed in certain cir- 
mstances, and often, more particularly, of 
ir feeling certain sensations. And this is 
‘general notion which we attach to the term 
stinct. 
sition, not to the will, but to the reason of 
- The most correct expression of the 
ence between an action prompted by in- 
and one prompted by reason is, that 
the first case the will acts in obedience to 
impulse which is directly consequent on 
certain sensations or emotions, felt or re- 
Membered; in the last it acts in obedience 
to an impulse which results from acts of 
to any observer of their habits. The utter ab-. 
INSTINCT. 3 
reasoning and imagination. It is incorrect to 
say, that all the actions of animals differ from 
those of man in being performed without 
anticipation of their effects. Many of the 
most familiar actions of animals are guided by 
a perfectly correct anticipation of their conse- 
quences, (otherwise they would not be suscep- 
tible of training); but it is such an anticipation 
as implies the exercise only of the faculty of 
memory. The term Reason is properly applied 
to the anticipation of those consequences of 
actions, of which we can be informed only 
by processes of reasoning and imagination, im- 
plying the exercise of the faculty of abstraction, 
and the formation of general notions or ideas. 
In some instances, the instinctive impulse, 
consequent on a particular sensation or suc- 
cession of sensations being felt, acts im- 
mediately on certain nerves and muscles; and 
no experience is necessary, in order that the: 
action required, although a complex and dif- 
ficult one, may be performed with perfect pre- 
cision, as in the case of the winking of the eye, 
or shrinking of the arm from injury, or of 
suction and deglutition following certain im- 
pressions on the mouth and throat. These 
actions seem to be very nearly if uot precisely 
on the same footing as those which have been 
described by Whytt and others as the natural 
effects of sensation, and by Dr. Marshall Hall 
as indications of what he terms the reflex func- 
tion of the spinal cord,—such as the actions of 
breathing, coughing, sneezing, vomiting, &c. ; 
and in which the intervention of sensation, al- 
though strongly indicated, is not universally 
admitted. 
But in the greater number of cases, the in- 
Stinctive determination appears to act not di- 
rectly on the nerves and muscles, but on the 
train of mental changes which serves as the 
motive to the exertion of the will; it extends 
to a long succession of actions, performed by 
individuals or by societies, each of which takes 
place under the influence of a mental deter- 
mination of a permanent character, and is often 
effected by a succession of voluntary efforts, 
which may require some habit and experience 
in order that they may be performed with pre- 
cision. Thus many animals require some 
length of experience before they acquire the 
use of their limbs or of their wings; but 
having acquired that power, they are taught by 
instinct to use them for the purpose of flight 
immediately on feeling certain sensations and 
emotions. In all such cases the actions are 
strictly voluntary, although the will acts, as 
we believe, in obedience to instinct, not to 
reason; and this seems to be the proper view 
to be taken of such long-continued and ad- 
mirably combined actions as we see in the for- 
mation of the nests of birds, or of the houses of 
beavers, or in other instances to be afterwards 
mentioned. The sensations of these animals, 
at particular seasons, excite a variety of mental 
operations, but these operations are all con- 
trolled and directed by the desire or propensity 
to the performance of certain definite actions, 
whether by the individual alone or in concert 
with others. In the performance of these ae- 
B 2 
