2 INSTINCT. 
laid by our ablest metaphysicians, “ the belief 
of the permanence of the order of nature,” or 
the conviction, “ that what has been as an an- 
tecedent, will be followed by what has been as 
a consequent ;” otherwise the lessons of expe- 
rience would be lost upon them, and no change 
could be effected in their habits by education. 
Under the influence of this mental law, it is 
certain that their recollections of past sensations 
excite in them various desires, and afford mo- 
_ tives to action, which prompt many of their 
movements exactly on the same principle by 
which the greater number of what are strictly 
called voluntary human actions are determined ; 
the object in view, in both cases, being simply 
to procure known pleasure or to avoid known 
pain, and the same metaphysical question pre- 
senting itself to the speculative inquirer as to 
both, viz. the question whether the voluntary 
power is really to will what we please, or is 
only to do what we will. Further, the various 
muscular movements required for any such 
actions, and the sensations and emotions which 
excite them, are gradually linked together by 
the mental principle of the association of ideas, 
so as to become obedient to the law of Habit in 
animals equally as in man. 
It has been generally admitted, since the 
time of Locke, that the essential inferiority of 
the intellect of animals, as com with that 
of man, lies in their very limited enjoyment of 
the faculty of abstraction, by which the mind 
is enabled to single out the different qualities 
or relations of the individual objects of sense, 
and make them the subject of abstract thought, 
and thereby form general notions, which are at 
once perceived to be equally applicable to 
many individual cases; and by help of which 
it continually elevates itself above the contem- 
plation of individuals, and classifies and me- 
thodizes its knowledge, and fits it for useful 
application,—for the deduction of inferences in 
reasoning, for the formation of fancied scenes 
in works of imagination, and for the adapta- 
tion of means to ends in practice. 
It is obvious, also, that none of those still. 
more general or abstract notions which conti-~ 
nually suggest themselves to the human mind 
in the course of the operations that are excited 
by the senses, such, for example, as space, time, 
number, power, &c. are indicated by any mani- 
festations that we see of the mental acts of the 
lower animals; and it may be stated, in general, 
that the limitation of their minds to particulars, 
and the want of the power of raising the 
thoughts to general ideas, and dwelling on the 
contemplation of these, is the grand obstacle to 
their adapting means to ends, drawing infe- 
rences from premises, or enjoying the use of 
language. The objections that have been started 
to this doctrine do not appear of much weight. 
Darwin, while he set aside the statement of 
Locke, endeavoured to distinguish instincts as 
* actions excited by sensations,” employed 
about the possession of pleasurable objects, or 
the avoiding of painful ones, already in our 
power, while voluntary (i.e. rational) actions 
are, employed “ about the means to acquire 
such objects.” But this distinction appears, 
on reflection, to be substantially the same. The — 
two noblest and most characteristic of the facul- — 
ties of the human mind, as defined by logi- 
cians, those of Reasoning and of Imagination, ~ 
(the latter of which is truly applicable to every 
kind of contrivance or adaptation of means to 
ends, of which we are capable,) evidently im- 
ply the existence of a mental power of forming 
and dwelling on general ideas, which are eq 
applicable to many individual cases; and if 
animals possessed this latter power, we might 
confidently expect to see them exhibit indica- 
tions of the two former. eae gs 
Why is it, for example, that Aptis 
who Gove been Fie St to assemble about the — 
fires which savages have made in the forests, — 
and been gratified by the warmth, have never 
been seen to gather sticks, and rekindle them 
when expiring? Not, certainly, because they 
are incapable of understanding that the fire — 
which warmed them formerly will do so again, 
but because they are incapable of a’ i 
and reflecting on that guality of wood, and that — 
relation of wood to fires already existing, which 
must be comprehended, in order that the action 
of renewing the fire may be suggested Fi 
is properly called an effort of Reason. Or why 
is it, that the different classes of predaceous — 
animals, although surrounded hy the materials — 
out of which the human race has manufactured 
so many implements of warfare, have never 
been able to avail themselves of any of them 
in aid of the instruments of destruction with 
which nature has agitate Arpeeatey 
because they are incapable of forming , 
general Bess i of the qualities and relations of 
external things, as are essential to the processes. 
of imagination and reasoning, by which men 
are led to the contrivance, and guided in the 
use, of artificial weapons. ee 
Again, although many of them are suscepti-. | 
ble of the emotions of joy, and to a certain 
degree of gratitude and attachment, founded 
on the sense and recollection of benefits, none — 
of them’ seem capable of forming the slightest — 
notion of that Divine Power, which has sug- 
gested itself to the human intellect in all ages, 
and even in the rudest conditions ha ‘| 
existence; we should regard any act of praise 
or prayer as an infallible indication of a mental 
capacity of the same rank as ourowM. 
Exceptions to this principle, to a certain ex. 
} 
f 
| 
a 
4 
| 
ia 
tent, must be admitted, as will eee 
pear, and the explanation of some of them 
certainly obscure; but the general fact un- 
doubtedly is, that those operations of the 
human intellect which imply the formation of 
general or abstract notions, or in the language: 
of Dr. Brown, the suggestion of relations, are. 
beyond the power of the lower animals. In- 
deed reflection on the nature of language, on: 
the small number of words (only substantive 
nouns, and only part of these) which apply to, 
individual objects, and on the necessity of the 
power of forming some kind of abstract or 
general notion, as indispensable to the use of 
every other kind of word, is sufficient to esta- 
blish, and is aig the simplest way of dis- 
tinctly conceiving, the essential difference be- 
