144 
lan on which the universe itself is constructed. 
Te is under the influence of such a power that 
every particular species of soul regularly con- 
structs a system of organs adapted to its func- 
tions ; at every species of soul appears uni- 
formly to have its own species of body.” * 
Now it is a little singular that, whilst the ten- 
dency of modern philosophy has been to ex- 
plode the idea of any secondary existence 
acting beneath the Creator on the constitution 
and actions of the universe, but to refer all 
its phenomena to the continued operation of 
the has which He first impressed on matter, 
hysiologists, neglecting the obvious analogy 
Garon the actions of the universe and those 
of any single organised being (the Macrocosm 
and Miercoes) inted out by Aristotle, 
should have rained, with but little modifica- 
tion, his opinion regarding the second ; and 
should still attribute the phenomena of life to 
a secondary agency existing in each being and 
modifying the ordinary laws of matter to its 
purposes. This subject, however, we shall 
dismiss for the present, to return to it here- 
after. 
The mode of explaining vital phenomena 
which has been adduced as an example of 
early speculation on the subject, appears to 
have resulted from two tendencies that may be 
observed to characterise the unenlightened mind 
both in past ages, and at the present time. The 
first is that which may be considered as natural 
to man in the infancy of philosophy,—to regard 
all matter, at least the grosser forms of it, as 
essentially inert, and therefore to attribute all 
spontaneous motion to a union of the thing 
moved with some substantial moving cause. 
Now, although modern science has given a 
more correct explanation of the causes of mo- 
tion in the inorganic world, and has shown 
that, so far from being inert, every particle of 
matter is capable of exhibiting actions of va- 
rious kinds when placed in certain relations to 
others,—the superficial enquirer still regards 
matter as inert guoad vital actions, and is un- 
willing to attribute them to any possible ope- 
ration of its properties. And in this mode of 
reasoning he would seem borne out by the 
peculiar history of organised beings,—the phe- 
nomena of their origin, growth, decline, dis- 
solytion, and decay,— the contemplation of 
which, with the desire of accounting for them, 
oceasions the second tendency to which we 
have alluded; that, namely, to infer from this 
history the existence of an unknown something, 
which during the living state preserves the in- 
tegrity of the body, and the loss of which 
occasions the disintegration of the fabric. 
Thus it has happened that the doctrine of the 
animating principle has retained its hold over 
the public mind from the earliest ages of the 
world to the present day; and the vestiges of 
the opinions of the early Greek philosophers 
may be traced in the expressions, vital spark, 
vital spirit, breath of life, and others which 
are still prevalent. 
* Barclay on Life and Organisation, pp. 429- 
433. 
LIFE. 
The chief modification which these doctrit 
have undergone, in their transit to mod 
physiologists, has been the separation of 
vital principle—the entity which is supp 
to effect the organisation of the body, 
employ that organism as the instrument ¢ 
operations—from the soul or mental prine 
which is concerned in a series of actions 
tirely distinct. It is somewhat singular, | 
ever, that even Aristotle regarded the sot 
reasoning faculties as separable from th 
mainder of the ¥uyn, and as capable of 
isting independently of the body; and aj 
division of this kind was adopted by 
Roman philosophers, who designated the 
and sensitive principles by the term Ay 
whilst to the rational they applied the nat 
Animus. We shall not follow these doet 
through all the modifications which resi 
from the unfathomable profundity of s 
systems of philosophy, and the prete 
shallowness of others; but shall procee 
once to the more modern opinions, whic 
either openly professed at the present tin 
lurk in the unillumined corners in whieh 
heterogeneous relics of former systems fi 
hiding place, whose darkness is congeni 
their disunited formlessness. 
The ancient doctrine of the identi 
vital with the mental principle was revive 
Stahl in a somewhat altered form. This pI 
sopher maintained that the rational soul is 
primum movens of organisation; that it 
ultimate and sole cause of ic activ 
and that by its operation, according to 
fixed laws, it preserves the bod d 
and cures the effects of disease. Still, now 
a distinction was drawn by him between the 
of the animus and the anima, which was 
served by his followers, who have regarded 
as wishing to identify them. He looked 1 
them as the common effects of one princi 
and his great error was in supposing tl 
analogy or parallelism existed between 
Now it is necessary to bear this doctri 
stantly in mind when reading the 
many of the physiologists of the last ¢ 
otherwise their meaning will be grea 
understood. In the writings of Wh 
example, we constantly find actions re ern 
the soul as their cause, when it is 
evident that the author did not mean tha 
mind (as it is now termed) was at all conce 
in them. This was the case with his ¥ 
class of vital and involun motions, tt 
production of which, he pi tates, 
Sciousness is not always necessary. 
there are few if any Thilasghall ho W 
avow such a doctrine as that of Stahl a 
present time, we trace its effects very evid 
exerted upon popular opinion. We have ki 
it maintained by many well-informed per 
that the phenomena of life and 
obviously so closely connected, that, to 
one class to the operation of the properti 
matter without an independent control 
entity,—in other words, to set aside the 
trine of a vital principle,—necessarily i 
the relinquishment of the idea of mind ; 
ys 
