148 
its countless living inhabitants. Have we, then, 
any more reason to assume that a vital prin- 
ciple or organic agent governs the concerns of 
each of these beings, than to sup that the 
Creator has delegated to a subordinate the care 
of each individual globe? Or is it not more 
consistent to suppose that upon the elements 
of all He impressed those simple properties, 
from whose mutual actions, foreseen and pro- 
vided for in the laws according to which they 
operate, all the varieties of change which it 
was His intention to produce, should necessa- 
rily result ? 
By another illustration of a different cha- 
racter we hope to set this point in a sull 
clearer light, and to be able to dismiss the 
subject without entering upon it as an abstract 
question. We shall suppose a young physio- 
logist, entirely ignorant of physical science, but 
educated in implicit faith in the vital principle, 
witnessing for the first time the action of a 
steam-engine. Here he would perceive a ma- 
chine composed of a number of dissimilar 
parts connected together, and moving by some 
secret agency which he desires to unveil. We 
may imagine him trying various experiments 
upon its functions,—such as shutting off the 
communication between the boiler and the cy- 
linder, or between the cylinder and the con- 
denser,—or applying cold where heat should 
be, and kindling a fire under the cold-water 
cisteru.. Hence he may arrive at the just con- 
clusion that the actions performed by each 
, when the machine was in regular opera- 
tion, have all a tendency towards one common 
object—the maintenance of its moving power. 
He will also perceive that these actions are as 
dissimilar as the structure of the exhi- 
biting them ; and he will not escape being sur- 
prised that the opposite influences of heat and 
cold should be essential to their production. 
Hence he may safely conclude that the whole 
series of phenomena is due to one presiding 
agency—a ‘steam-engine principle,”—by the 
operation of which upon the material structure, 
its actions are produced, and made to har- 
monize with each other, and with their ultimate 
object. And this conviction would be very 
much strengthened if he saw the machine en- 
dowed (as we may, for illustration, imagine 
quite possible) with the means of supplying 
its own wants,—regularly adding fuel to its fire, 
and cold water to its condensing cistern,—and 
even repairing for itself the loss it sustains by 
wear of material. Would such a person, en- 
tirely unacquainted with the properties of 
steam, be acting more unphilosophically in en- 
tertaining this notion, than in attributing the 
actions exhibited by living beings to the opera- 
tion of a vital principle? We think not. In 
each case the machine or organism is framed 
to take advantage of the properties with which 
the Creator first endowed matter; and the dif- 
ference is that, while the design of man con- 
structed the first to bring into operation those 
properties which alone he can control, the de- 
sign of Omnipotence constructed the second, 
and adapted it to develope properties of matter, 
which can only be exercised under the condi- 
LIFE. 
tions which a living being suppli 
which man, therefore, cannot avail him 
We may conclude, then, that if we c 
vital actions to the properties of the or 
which exhibit them, called into of on 
their appropriate stimuli, we do not re 
any other explanation of their mutual 
tion and dependence than the original d 
of the Creator. “No agent,” it has 
remarked, “can be required to adjust 
gulate the actions which ensue from this 
tual adaptation, since they are, like all 
phenomena in the universe, under the e 
of laws inseparable from their very existe 
But the question next arises, by wh 
have organised bodies become posse 
peculiar properties? It is, as we 4 
a a mere verbal alteration to attr 
e vital actions of an 0 to its peculiz 
perties; since we wade by hese pr 
ties only the capability of giving rise & 
changes which we witness, and we only 
of their existence by the observation ¢ 
changes. The real causes of the fF 
must be sought for in the events 
concerned in the formation of the 
and its first endowment with the 
which it exhibits ; and this leads us to co 
IV. THE coNNECTION BETWEEN — 
LITY AND ORGANISATION.—When Our 
quiry into the laws of Physics terminé 
referring any of its phenomena to the actic 
one of the universal properties of matt 
feel satisfied that we can trace the operatic 
second causes no higher; and that the ex 
of this property as inseparable from m 
and therefore as essential to our idea of 
the immediate result of the will of t 
Butin a great variety of instances we 
so; and we observe properties 
and inseparable from certain forms of m 
the laws of whose action, however, are 
finite as in the first case. Such pro 
therefore, form a ye of our notion of 
particular forms of matter; thus, the ma 
properties of iron, or the energetic attr 
which potassium has for oxygen, are ¢ 
ristics of these substances, which 
with others to distinguish them in our 4 
from other forms of matter possessing: 
properties in common with them. & 
properties will not be manifested exe 
peculiar conditions ; and according 
rity of the occurrence of those conditio 
be the probability of our remaining | 
of the property. We are obliged 
therefore, that every form of matter wit 
we are acquainted may have properti 
which we know nothing, simply bec 
not been placed in the circu 
to call them into activity; since it isonh 
action of some kind that the mind ¢ 
cognisant of their existence. We 
that it is very possible that all mati 
least all those forms of it capable of be 
organised, may be possessed of f 
which shall give rise to the action 
vital, when they are placed in ce 
tions; and that the mere absence of 
ert. 
a 
iz 
ed 
