APPENDIX. 423 



a foretaste of future plunder, as he would give them every assistance to 

 destroy the whole of the province of Santa Fe when their force would 

 arrive. Lopez, intimidated at this threat, and envious of Carrera, made 

 a dishonourable peace with his enemy, — selling us, as has been before stated. 

 Carrera was accidentally enabled to defend himself from the machinations 

 of his insidious enemies, by uniting himself with those very Indians who had 

 been called for his destruction ; and necessity obliged him to scourge his 

 enemies with the same lash under which they had deliberately doomed him 

 to suffer. 



Carrera did in no way encourage the Indians in their attack on Salta : on 

 the contrary, he did every thing in his power, and perhaps more than was 

 consistent with his safety, to dissuade them from it ; and though he permitted 

 a detachment of soldiers to accompany them, it was for the express purpose 

 of more effectually deterring them by showing an example of fear, that he 

 might thereby prevent the disorders necessarily emanating from the surrender 

 of the town. 



Unless by some such stratagem as that tried by Carrera, the destruction 

 of Salta could not possibly have been prevented by us. The Indians are 

 naturally jealous and distrustful ; and it cannot be supposed that Carrera 

 could have such an unbounded ascendancy over their minds in the first days 

 of our union with them, as he afterwards acquired by a longer acquaintance 

 with them. There was no province that would receive us ; and Carrera, by 

 restraining them from their project, would have shut the last and only 

 avenue which was left us for retreat. If we absolutely refused to allow the 

 assault, they would in the same moment mistrust us of being attached to the 

 enemy, and as enemies they would proceed against us. Their force was 

 upwards of 900, and our squadron about 140. However, Rodriguez in his 

 proclamation hinted that we were more barbarous than the Indians them- 

 selves, for not having opposed them. If Rodriguez judged of the Indians 

 from his knowledge of the Porteiios, there is some excuse for him ; for our 

 140 men were more than sufficient to control and drive 1000 Porteiios with- 

 out difficulty; but with that disparity of numbers, against the Indians, we 

 could indulge no rational hopes of success. Hence our open and active 

 mediation in favour of the town would have been as useless towards its 

 safety, as it would have been impolitic, injurious, and destructive, with regard 

 to our interests. We had indeed an excellent opportunity of dying in 

 defence of our most implacable enemies, one of whom would not have been 



